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ABSTRACT
EFFECTS OF FREE RIDERS AND INCENTIVE DISCRIMINATION ON
CUSTOMER ACQUISITION AND RETENTION RESOURCE ALLOCATION
BY
Geng Wang
May 11, 2006
Committee Chair:

Thomas Whalen

Major Academic Unit:

Department of Managerial Sciences

How should a company best allocate its spending between acquisition and retention?
Under what condition should a company devote resources and money to analytics? The
above questions are just examples of more general issues concerning many companies
when managing their customer acquisition and retention programs. To answer the above
questions, I will conduct a study on the allocation of financial resources between
incentives that target different types of customers, and the allocation of resources
between incentives and analytics spending. This research first distinguishes between
customers and acquisition, between incentive and price discount, and between acquisition
and retention. It then proposes a new concept, “free rider”, in a customer acquisition and
retention context. Building on the free-rider concept, two mathematical models are
formulated to examine the optimal allocation between acquisition incentive, retention
incentive, and analytics spending. Closed-form solutions are reached for both models
and the results are interpreted in the context of marketing practice. The conditions
leading to different patterns of optimal solutions of analytics spending, acquisition
incentives, and retention incentives are discussed. Specifically, the detailed conditions
under which the optimal acquisition incentives is zero or non-zero, the optimal retention
incentives is zero or non-zero, and the optimal analytics spending is zero or non-zero, are
provided. Factors determining the ceiling for acceptable level of cost of analytics are
also examined.
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Abstract
How should a company best allocate its spending between acquisition and retention?
Under what condition should a company devote resources and money to analytics? The
above questions are just examples of more general issues concerning many companies
when managing their customer acquisition and retention programs. To answer the above
questions, I will conduct a study on the allocation of financial resources between
incentives that target different types of customers, and the allocation of resources
between incentives and analytics spending. This research first distinguishes between
customers and acquisition, between incentive and price discount, and between acquisition
and retention. It then proposes a new concept, “free rider”, in a customer acquisition and
retention context. Building on the free-rider concept, two mathematical models are
formulated to examine the optimal allocation between acquisition incentive, retention
incentive, and analytics spending. Closed-form solutions are reached for both models
and the results are interpreted in the context of marketing practice. The conditions
leading to different patterns of optimal solutions of analytics spending, acquisition
incentives, and retention incentives are discussed. Specifically, the detailed conditions
under which the optimal acquisition incentives is zero or non-zero, the optimal retention
incentives is zero or non-zero, and the optimal analytics spending is zero or non-zero, are
provided. Factors determining the ceiling for acceptable level of cost of analytics are
also examined.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Background and Introduction

In today’s economy, the service sector accounts for two-thirds of the GDP of the United
States and the European Union alike. Customer base is becoming increasingly important
to service-oriented businesses. Customers are recognized not only as the buyers of the
company’s products and services, but also as assets of the companies’ (Gupta &
Lehmann, 2003). As a result, companies pay more and more attention to attracting and
retaining customers in addition to selling products and services. One of the important
measures that companies take to accomplish the mission of attracting and retaining
customers is to offer their prospects and customers acquisition incentives or retention
incentives. The ability to spend the incentive money effectively in order to minimize the
cost or maximize the return will directly contribute to the companies’ bottom lines and
their competitiveness.

What is the “best” amount of incentives a company should offer to its prospect customers
or existing customers in order to attract or retain them? What factors will affect the level
of incentive?

Although many studies (Blattberg & Deighton, 1996. Berger & Nasr, 1998. Reinartz et
al, 2005.) have been conducted in attempt of answering the above questions, none has
examined the effects of analytics and incentive-discrimination. Since price-
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discrimination is widely discussed in studies about consumer purchasing behavior, the
lack of study or even the mentioning of effect of incentive-discrimination on incentive
allocations, in this author’s view, represents a gap in the knowledge base. At the
conclusion of this research, I will demonstrate that this study contributes to the theory
and managerial practice in many ways such as defining the ceiling of acceptable level of
cost of analytics, and providing managerial directions when company’s customer base or
competitive situation changes. In addition, the study will also provide answer to the
question of “Why on the one hand, retention is considered a more cost-effective means
than acquisition; but on the other hand, companies are often criticized for spending less
than they should on retention?” By answering this question, a gap between the existing
marketing theory and common marketing practice will also be bridged.

Specifically, this research formulates mathematical models and examines how customer
characteristics and the company’s ability to incentive-discriminate its customer base
affects its optimal decision regarding the amount of acquisition incentives, retention
incentives, and analytics spending.

In the remainder of Chapter 1, to distinguish incentives from simple price discounts, a
compare-and-contrast between incentives and price discounts, as well as between
incentives and volume discounts, will be conducted. In Chapter 2, a review of literature
will be presented to provide the foundation for the model. In Chapter 3, I will present
the specific research questions and establish the framework for the models. In Chapter
4, justification for using a mathematical model is provided. In Chapter 5 and 6, a “base
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model” and an “extended model” will be formulated and the optimal solutions will be
solved. Chapter 7 will discuss the contributions of the study and propose future research
directions.

1.2 Incentive-Discrimination
In this research, the effects of “incentive-discrimination” on the decisions regarding
acquisition incentive, retention incentive, and analytics spending is examined. In
economics as well as in marketing, price discrimination, which refers to charging
different customers different prices, has been broadly studied and practiced. This
research, however, positions itself in the context of customer acquisition and retention
process, where customers are attracted and retained through incentives offerings.
Similar to price discrimination, but in a customer acquisition and retention setting, the
concept of incentive-discrimination is proposed and its effect is studied. In this study,
incentive-discrimination is defined as “offering acquisition and retention incentives only
to prospects or customers who satisfy certain criteria”.

1.3 The Nature and Functions of “Incentive”
What constitutes an incentive?

How does an incentive differ from a price discount or a

quantity (volume) discount?
Although “incentive” and “discount” are often used interchangeably, it is important in the
context of this study to clearly distinguish one from the other.

A price discount is

usually a reduction in price that aims at increasing present or short-term demand only.
For example, in order to sell quickly some of its groceries, a grocer cuts the prices on
those items.

A volume discount (or quantity discount) is a type of price discount that is
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given in the form of a reduction in unit price for high volume purchases. For example, a
company constructs its price schedule as such that when the higher volume is ordered, the
unit price will decrease. An incentive (for acquisition or retention) is a discount
(including cash, free products, or free services) aimed at attracting or retaining customers
and increasing long term demand.

For example, a cell phone company offers discount if

the customer agrees to sign a one-year service contract.

As I will demonstrate below, sometimes a price reduction/concession is compounded,
meaning that it can function both as a simple price discount and as an incentive.
Therefore, when the actual incentive amount has to be measured or the optimal incentive
amount has to be implemented, it is important that we identify the true amount of
incentive embedded in a price reduction/concession.

Because one of the major

objectives of this study is to understand the determinants of optimal incentive decisions,
without a clear distinction between an incentive and a discount, the magnitude of
incentive will be distorted and the results will be sub-optimal.
I will first compare and contrast between incentive and discount, incentive and volume
discount, then I will summarize their differences from the following perspectives:
•

Strategic

•

Specific Objectives

•

Operational

•

Time Effect

1.3.1 Incentive vs. Price Discount
Existence of Switching Cost as a Necessary Condition for Incentives
4

In retail business, some stores have “moving sale” or “out of business sale” before they
move or close businesses. Also, in many markets, companies cut prices in order to
reduce excess supplies or inventories. The purpose of these price discounts is to
increase the demand for the time being only. They are simple price discounts.

The

purpose of incentives, in contrast, is to increase the demand not only for the time being
but also for the future periods as well.

Under what conditions will a discount offered in the current period also increase the
demand in the future periods?

Customers come back in the future because they might

find it convenient to buy in the same store, feel more certain about the product they have
already tried, find it troublesome to learn a new store layout, or feel unwilling to learn a
different type of machine or operation procedure. For example, time and effort is
required for making phone calls and completing paperwork if a customer wants to switch
from one wireless phone services to another. Time and effort is also required for
learning a different store layout if a consumer switches to a new super-market.

In

addition to the time and effort spent, the consumer might also face the uncertainty in the
quality of the new services or products.

The time, effort, uncertainty and so on that are part of the switching process can be
characterized as “switching costs.” Switching costs are defined as costs incurred to a
customer when he switches in or out from one company’s products or services to a
competitor’s.

(More broadly, we can also regard a fresh new customer’s costs of joining

as switching costs.)

Switching costs usually include monetary cost such as new
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equipment, search cost such as time spent to learn about the new product or service, and a
mental cost for people who are dislike uncertainties and risks.

Also, “Customer

loyalty,” although not necessarily rational, can also be regarded as a type of switching
cost.

Besides the “natural” switching costs that are inherent in the process, artificial

switching costs can be created or imposed by the companies to deter switching-out. For
example, early termination penalty is a type of artificial switching costs that cell phone
companies impose.

These switching costs make it more likely for customers to stay with their current product
or service providers. Without switching costs (monetary, or mental), a customer can
churn freely and his future purchases will not be related to his current purchases.
Therefore, a simple price discount without the switching cost, although increases the
demand for the current purchase, will not affect future demand.

Once the simple price

discount is withdrawn, its effect on demand will disappear immediately.

Therefore, the

necessary condition for a simple price discount to become an incentive is the presence of
switching cost.

In other words, the presence of switching cost is what distinguishes an

incentive from a discount.

Examples of Switching Cost and Incentives: Contract vs. No-contract

In this section, I will demonstrate the connection between switching cost and incentives
by examining examples of incentives with contract and incentives without contract. The
purpose of a contract is to create an artificial switching cost. Therefore, contract is often
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used to compensate for the low natural switching cost.

As the following examples will

show, to bring repeat businesses, a contract usually accompanies the acquisition
incentives where the natural switching cost is low.

Example 1: Cell Phone - Contract
A typical case for incentives with a contract is that of the cell phone services.

A cell

phone service usually requires a customer to sign a one-year contract in order to receive a
phone at discounted price or for free.

The one-year contract with early termination

penalty is an artificially created switching-out cost.

This switching cost would deter

people from switching carriers before the term is due.

Example 2: Bank Account – No Contract
An example for no-contract incentive is bank accounts or trading accounts.

In these

cases, what lacks of in terms of using contracts to deter the churning of the customers is
made up by the high “natural” switching costs. Because of the high security and privacy
requirements, banking functions such as account opening/account closing/transfer of
funds/paycheck direct deposit etc. represent significant switching costs that are inherent
in the process.

The inherent high switching cost is also enhanced by the free add-on

services such as “Online Bill Pay,” which enables a customer to pay bills on-line and pay
recurring bills month after month automatically. By offering these services, an
“artificial” switching cost is also created without using a contract.

Example 3: Credit Card – No Contract
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Another example for no-contract case is credit card.

Different from bank account,

which has high natural switching costs, credit card has low natural switching costs.
Because customers can churn easily (by filling up the application form that is received in
the mail), the switching cost is usually artificially by providing airline mileages or cash
back on purchases.

To summarize, an incentive program must be accompanied either by natural switching
costs or by creating artificial ones.
The connection between switching cost, contract, and incentive is as follows:
•

Switching cost is a necessary condition for incentives.

•

The magnitude of the natural switching cost primarily determines whether a
contract is necessary or not.

The higher the natural switching cost, the lower the

need for contract.
•

Contract is a means of increasing switching cost artificially. When an incentive
is offered with a contract, an artificial incentive is created and attached.

•

There are other means of artificially increasing switching cost without using
contracts, for example, free on-line bill pay services.

•

When an incentive is offered without a contract, there must be either natural
switching cost, or other forms of artificial switching cost, or both.

Summary of examples

8

The Table 1 summarizes the four commonly seen services examples of various types of
switching costs and incentives.

1.3.2 Incentive vs. Volume Discount
There are similarities between incentives and volume discounts.

For example, in both

cases, the overall larger total purchases will lower the unit price for the buyer.

However,

volume discount differs from incentive in their functions.

Functions and Reasons for Volume Discount
A review of literature has found four reasons for volume discount/quantity discount:
1. Economics: Price discrimination. Buchanen (1953) argues that the demand schedule
of large buyers is more elastic than the small buyers.
given to these larger buyers to attract their purchases.

Therefore, discount must be
However, quantity discount is

not a universal means for price discrimination – sometimes quantity surcharge is used
instead.

For example, Cude & Walker (1984) conduct over 2,000 price comparisons

and find that about 10% of them have quantity surcharges. Canned tuna fish,
laundry detergent are among the most often seen.

In these instances, the unit price

per pound or per ounce of a larger package is actually higher than a smaller package.
Agrawal (1993) conduct an empirical study and infer that quantity surcharges is a
price discrimination tool aimed at large households, who have high demands, high
storage capacities, and high searching costs. Therefore, the price discrimination
function of volume discount is but one specific reaction to certain customer’s
preferences.
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2. Economics: Economy of scale.

Some production function will result in reduced per

unit fixed cost or reduce variable cost when the volume is higher.

Therefore, the

economy of scale function of volume discount is a consequence of certain production
functions.
3. Supply Chain: Collaborative procurement, inventory coordination, lot-sizing, revenue
sharing, vender-buyer collaboration and game, etc.

From an operations

management/supply chain perspective, Munson et al. (1998) classifies this function of
volume discount as “joint buyer-seller perspective.”

Therefore, this function is the

result of an increased efficiency between the buyer’s and seller’s organizations.
4. Marketing: Attracting buyers, etc. Munson & Rosenblatt (1998) conduct a survey
asking marketing managers why they offer volume/quantity discounts.

In addition

to the common reasons of economy of scale in manufacturing and purchasing, survey
participants replied that a volume discount is used to attract new customers.

The

authors state that “in situations where switching suppliers is difficult or costly, some
suppliers offer large quantity discounts to new customers. Despite the mediocre
profits on the initial sale, more profitable subsequent sales usually follow.”
function is actually customer acquisition and retention incentive.

This

However, this also

indicates that the volume discount actually functions as a simple price discount except
that some switching cost is present. The essence of this type of volume discount is
not the “volume” but the “discount.”

Decomposition of Volume Discount
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From the above section’s discussion, apparently, a volume discount can function as an
incentive just as other simple price discounts. However, since a volume discount can be
offered for many reasons, it is important in this study to decompose any particular
volume discount.

In other words, since the amount of incentive is of the primary

interest to this study, it is important to know whether the volume discount is given
because of price discrimination, economy of scale, supply chain efficiency, or an
acquisition/retention incentive. It is also important to realize that not all quantity
discounts function as incentives unless they are accompanied by switching costs.

If a volume discount is serving multiple functions, it can be decomposed of the following
four components: discrimination, economy of scale, supply-chain effectiveness, and
incentive as shown below:
Total Volume Discount
=Amount for discrimination + Amount for economy of scale + Amount for Supply Chain
efficiency + Amount for incentives

Although in reality, it is difficult to separate the four components and allocate precisely
the correct proportions to each function, one can at least qualitatively understand that
only a proportion of the amount of volume discount offered should be regarded as
incentive. To illustrate, I categorize volume discount into the following three scenarios:
•

When a volume discount is not an incentive. If a volume discount is largely due
to the reasons of, for example, economy of scale, then treating it entirely as an
incentive will make the incentives larger than it actually is. Since the necessary
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condition for a discount to become an incentive is the existence of switching cost,
when there is no switching cost, a volume discount will just be a discount, not an
incentive.

•

When a volume discount is a mixture of many functions. This is the most
common case.

It is when there are both switching cost and other reasons such as

economy of scale. As discussed above, there are four main reasons for providing
volume discount.

And sometimes these various reasons can be present in a

single offer of volume discount.

For example, a quantity discount can be offered

because of the firm’s economy-of-scale, its intent to price-discriminate, and the
switching costs.

In this case, the true magnitude of incentive is less than the

total discount.

•

When a volume discount is entirely an incentive. When there is no economy of
scale, or discrimination, or supply chain efficiency, a volume discount offered to a
customer is entirely an acquisition/retention incentive.

In this case, a volume

discount is a “pure” acquisition/retention incentive.

Volume Discount vs. Incentive: A multiple-time-period perspective

From the time perspective, volume discount often aims at increased order quantity while
retention aims at increased length of relationship.

For example, if the annual demand of

a particular customer is a fixed amount, then volume discount would increase demand per
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order and decrease the number of orders, while the retention incentives will increase the
number of years the customer stays with the company.

For example, a volume discount will increase the demand from p to p+q (q>0) in the
current period; an incentive will maintain the current period demand at p, but increase the
number of period that the customer is with the company from n to n+m (m>0).

In a

multi-period framework, this will result in an increase in the demand of the future periods.

1.3.3 Strategic Differences between Incentives and Discounts

In addition to switching cost, there are other differences between incentives and price
discounts. These differences can be attributed to different corporate strategies, i.e.,
Customer-centric vs. Product-centric.

Different from a traditional product-centric business, which focuses on product sales, a
customer-centric business emphasizes on the following key characteristics of customer
relations:
•

A customer usually makes a stream of purchases instead of one.

The product-

centric approach does not take this into account.
•

The probability that a customer makes his next purchase is dependent on his past
purchases. The product-centric approach does not capture this aspect.

•

The product-centric approach does not consider the issue of switching cost.
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•

For a customer-centric business, the corporate structure is often formed around
customers instead of products.

For example, Fidelity Personal Investments

structured the corporation around customer segments such as “accounts with more
than $500,000,” “active traders,” and “retirees,” etc.

Product managers report to

the segment CEOs. (Selden, L. & Colvin, G. 2003)

Therefore, the differences between offering a customer goods or services at discounted
prices and offering him acquisition/retention incentives can be viewed from the following
perspectives:
•

Strategic: Discount is usually a tool for executing product-centered strategy while
incentive is for customer-centered strategy. The subject in price discount is the
products/services; whereas in acquisition/retention incentives, it is the customers.

•

Objectives: The primary purpose for most price discounts is to increase demand.
The purpose for incentives, however, is to attract or retain customers.

•

Operational: Price discounts are usually not targeted towards a specific group of
customer, and are often publicized. The incentives are usually targeted to certain
groups of customers and sometimes are kept confidential.

•

Outcomes: The outcome of the price discount is measured by the quantity of
products/services sold. The outcome of the incentives is the number of
customers acquired or retained.

•

Time frames: Price discount can be regarded as a one-time transaction, whereas
incentives bring a stream of transactions.

The evaluation of the effect of

incentives is usually in a multi-period context.
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1.3.4 Summary
The main difference between a non-incentive price discount (including volume discount)
and an acquisition/retention incentive is summarized in Table 2.
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Chapter 2: Review of Literature

This review of literature examines the relevant views and evidences relating to the issues
in customer acquisition and retention.

2.1 Customer Satisfaction, Loyalty, and Retention
2.1.1 Is a satisfied customer necessarily a loyal customer?
The importance of customer satisfaction has been heralded for decades, if not longer.
The saying “customer is always right” exemplifies the emphasis on customer service and
customer satisfaction. By increasing customer satisfaction, the companies hope to
achieve customer loyalty because a loyal customer will even overlook the flaws of the
company, therefore giving the company competitive advantages over its competitors. As
Oliver (1999) puts it:
When a consumer voluntarily removes him- or herself from competitive overtures,
effectively tuning out persuasive arguments to switch, he or she achieved a state
not unlike the concept of love.
So, if satisfied customers are loyal customers and loyal customers bring more profits to
the company in the long run, then why do not companies make all of their customers
satisfied by offering, for example, every customer acquisition and retention incentives?

Firstly, loyalty might be very costly to achieve and is not always attainable. Jones et al.
(1995) find that “true long-term loyalty” is only achieved when customers are
“completely satisfied”. Customers who are less than “completely satisfied” will defect
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easily when opportunities present. Oliver (1999) concludes that depending on the nature
of the product or the segment of consumers, loyalty is not attainable by many firms.
Therefore, many companies have to settle for various degrees of customer satisfaction,
instead of customer loyalty.

Secondly, even complete satisfaction does not guarantee loyalty. In a study regarding
the relationship between customer satisfaction and customer loyalty, Jones and Sasser
(1995) characterize four types of customers based on their satisfaction and loyalty
relations. The two types that have positive relations between satisfaction and loyalty
are: the “loyalists”, who are high on satisfaction and high on loyalty; and the “defectors”,
who are low on both satisfaction and loyalty. Interestingly, there are two types that do
not have positive relations between satisfaction and loyalty. They are the “mercenaries”
and the “hostages.” “Mercenaries” are those who have high satisfaction level but low to
medium loyalty level; and “hostages” are those who are low on satisfaction but high on
loyalty.

Lee et al (2001) provide explanation on why some customers are low on satisfaction but
high on loyalty. They find that switching costs play an important role in moderating the
relationship between customer satisfaction and loyalty. The weak link between
satisfaction and loyalty happens when the switching cost is high. Because high
switching costs deter unsatisfied customers from defecting, the unsatisfied customers
appear to be “loyal”. Oliver (1999) argues that although satisfaction is a necessary
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condition for loyalty, there are other mechanisms such as personal fortitude and social
bonding that contribute to the loyalty.

As Simon (1955, 1972) proposes in his study about “bounded rationality” that humans
are subject to the cognitive limitations and therefore often make decisions that are not
rational. Customer loyalty clearly contains such non-rational components. For
example, some loyal customers of Ford choose Ford automobiles not because they have
rationally evaluated the choices but because their fathers and grandfathers all drove Ford
automobiles.

Based on the above review, we can conclude that acquisition and retention incentive play
a role in customer’s “rational” switching decision process, except for the most “loyal”
customers. The current study positions itself by examining only the rational aspect of
customer switching. Specifically, in this study, it is assumed that all customers make
their decision by evaluating the amount of switching cost and the incentive offered to
them.

Therefore, by manipulating the acquisition and retention incentive offering, a

customer can be affected in his switching decision.

2.2 Valuing Customers
Recent studies hold the view that customer base is the assets of a company and its value
can be assessed quantitatively. For example, Gupta & Lehmann (2003) quantitatively
link a company’s customer base to its profitability and its financial valuation. In their
study, they estimate that the average value of an E*Trade customer is about $960.
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Models that calculate customer values have been employed to direct the practice of
customer acquisition and retention. For example, in marketing applications, Customer
Lifetime Value (CLV or LTV), can be used to assist customer acquisition and retention
decisions (Dwyer, 1989). It is often used as the objective function of an
acquisition/retention effort. Lifetime value of a customer is the present value of future
stream of costs that this customer incurs and incomes this customer brings. If we denote
the profit margin that a customer generates during a specific period t as mt, then the lifetime value of the customer (LTV), with a discount rate of i, and a constant retention rate
of r, is given by the following formula (Gupta, 2003):
∞

mt r t
LV = ∑
t
t = 0 (1 + i )
The emphasis of LTV formulation is on the multi-period perspective of customer cost
and revenue stream. The unit of analysis in LTV formulation is individual customers or
cohorts of customers. However, since the current study is primarily concerned with the
allocation between acquisition incentive and retention incentives, and the goal is to solve
for the optimal allocation between acquisition and retention incentive in any given single
time period, I will not use a multi-period framework as the LTV. Nevertheless, the
current model is consistent with the LTV formulation and the proof is provided in
Appendix I.

2.3 Switching Cost Distribution
2.3.1 Switching Cost Distribution
Switching cost is one of the important factors in customer switching decision. Switching
costs vary among different customers. Epling (2002) presents the empirical evidence of
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heterogeneous switching costs among customers in the telecommunications industry.
Although switching cost cannot always be observed directly, it can be estimated through
other observable variables such as the number of switches within a certain period of time
(Epling, 2002).

In switching decision process, a “rational” consumer evaluates between the option of
switching and not switching in a similar fashion as he evaluates between the options of
buying and not buying in a typical purchasing decision. The only difference is that in a
typical purchase, the consumer makes comparison between his reservation price and the
product price while in a switching decision the consumer compares his switching cost
(including the future switch-out cost) with the incentive and the benefit of switching.
Therefore, previous literature on consumer reservation price distributions provides
reasonable indication of switching cost distribution.

Many studies assume uniform distribution for reservation prices of consumers
(Venkatesh, R. & Kamakura, W. 2003; McGuire, T., and Staelin, R. 1983.). Shifted
exponential distribution, which is composed of a constant plus an exponential random
variable, is also examined (Lin, 2004). Since the demand function is a cumulative
function of the reservation price, a uniform distribution of the customer reservation prices
corresponds to a linear demand function of price. By using a linear demand function
with an intercept, Pollak (1976) also implicitly applies a uniform distribution in his study.
For the analyses in this study, I choose a uniform distribution for switching cost.
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2.4 Price Discrimination/Targetability/Incentive Discrimination
Because the reservation prices vary from one customer to the next, the ability to identify
each customer’s reservation price will enable the firms to better price-discriminate. The
term “price discrimination”, meaning charging different prices to different buyers (Frank,
R.H. 1994), is seen widely in economics literatures. In marketing literatures, terms such
as “customer differentiation” and “targetability” are also used. For example, Pelham
(1997) uses the term “customer differentiation” to describe a firm’s ability to separate
groups of customers whose buying needs and motives are different. Chen et al (2001)
defines “targetability” as a firm’s ability to predict the preferences and behaviors of
customers for the purpose of customizing price or product offers.

The effects of price-discrimination or targetability have been studied primarily in a
setting of competitive firms. Chen et al (2001) examine the consequences of firms’
increased targetability on competing firms’ strategies. They show that in a two-firm
competitive market setting, the improvement in targetability can increase not only the
firm’s own profitability but also the competition’s profitability.

Although discrimination has been studies previously, the primary focus of those studies is
the product purchasing process, instead of acquisition and retention process. For this
study, I will introduce the term “incentive-discrimination” to describe a company’s
ability to identify prospect or customers with different switching cost and offer
acquisition incentives or retention incentives selectively as the result of such ability.
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Continuous Model vs. Discrete Model in Predicting Switching or Response
In practice, the prediction about customers’ preferences (or switching costs) is achieved
through predictive modeling, which analyzes customer demographic, geographic, and
purchase information and provides predictions. Many analytical tool such as logistic
regression, neural networks, and genetic algorithms have been used in predictive
modeling. Under the ideal situation, when the prediction is about customers’ switching
costs, a model that provides the detailed customer switching cost is better than a model
that only predicts “high” and “low”. However, Bodapati & Gupta (2004) demonstrated
that when the information about prospects or customers is limited, the discretized model,
which applies binary dependent variable such as response vs. no-response, performs
better than a continuous model, which uses continuous dependent variable (household
spending in dollars). This is because when the predictive models are statistically biased
due to the quality of data and the limited availability of information, as it is very often the
case in marketing and consumer purchasing data, the binary model helps lowering the
bias and produces better predictions.

Based on the above review, in the current study, I will define the outcome of the analytics
as the identification of a free rider or not (discrete), instead of his or her switching cost
(continuous).

2.5 Optimizing Acquisition and Retention Spending
Since a dollar can be spent toward either acquiring a prospect or retaining a customer,
this leads to the question of “How much money should be spent on acquisition incentives
vs. retention incentive so that the cost of acquisition and retention is minimized?”
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Blattberg & Deighton (1996) present a method of calculating optimal level of acquisition
spending and retention spending. In their study, they assume that the acquisition rate is
an exponential function of acquisition spending. After the function’s parameters are
estimated, and the margin per customer is known, the optimal level of acquisition
spending can be calculated. The same process is applied to the calculation of the
optimal retention spending. Their research examines the acquisition and retention
separately but does not investigate the combined effects between acquisition incentive
and retention incentive.

Berger & Nasr (1998) extend the above method by providing a nonlinear programming
based solution to the optimal allocation between acquisition spending and retention
spending. In the above study, however, the acquisition rate or the number of customers
acquired is a function of acquisition incentive only. They do not include the ability to
incentive-discriminate into the model, nor do they examine the effect of different
customer switching cost distributions.

The optimal allocation between acquisition and retention resources has also been studied
empirically. Reinartz et al (2005) use statistical model to estimate the parameters in
their model and perform simulation analyses. However, in their model, the effects of
incentive-discrimination is not studied.
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2.6 Commonly Observed Level of Acquisition Rate and Retention Rate
The acquisition rate and retention rate can vary greatly between different industries,
products, and services.

On retention rate, Clark (1997) uses two branches of a major retail bank in UK. The
customer retention rate ranged from 60% to 75%. However, the study fails to specify
the length of time period on which the retention rate is measured. Reichheld (1996)
estimates that a typical company has customer defection rate of 10% to 30%, or retention
rate of 70% to 90% annually. Gupta and Lehmann (2003) report the annual retention
rate of several companies: CDNow, an internet startup company, 51%-68%; Capital One,
85%; AT&T, estimated at 81%; Ameritrade, an internet trading company, 94%-95%.

On acquisition rate, Birkin & Clarke (1998) report that direct mailing’s response rate
ranged from 1% in random mailing to 5% - 10% for mailings with geographic and/or
demographic targeting. Schlegelmilch & Woodruffe (1995) cite a bank vice president as
saying that the response rate for affinity credit card are normally around 2%, but could be
as high as 5% to 7% for each round of solicitation.

2.7 Summary
The “ideal” solution to the problem of customer acquisition and retention is to attract or
create “loyal” customers who “love” (Oliver, 1999) the product, the service, or the
company. However, in many product or service markets, either satisfaction does not
guarantee loyalty, or loyalty is not attainable at all. In these markets, facing the mostly
“rational” customers who make switching decisions based on the evaluation of switching
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cost and benefit, a company must employ incentives as means to acquire and retain
customers. The effectiveness of such incentives will contribute directly to the
profitability of the company. Although studies have been conducted in the area of price
discrimination and the area of optimal incentive allocation, none was focused on the
effects of incentive-discrimination on optimal incentive allocation in a customer
acquisition and retention setting.
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Chapter 3: Research Questions, and Model Framework
3.1 Motivation
In previous studies about optimal acquisition and retention spending (Blattberg &
Deighton, 1996. Berger & Nasr, 1998.), acquisition or retention rate at a certain
acquisition or retention spending level is treated as exogenous variable or “given”. In
those models, an incentive budget of $5million would correspond to, for example, an
acquisition rate of 3%. So, in those studies, acquisition rate or retention rate is treated as
a function of incentive spending only.

However, the situation is different in the real business world. For example, direct
marketing companies have been utilizing “predictive modeling” techniques to predict the
response or non-response of prospects and send out offers selectively in order to achieve
a better response or acquisition rate. This indicates that acquisition rate is not only a
function of incentive spending but also a function of the ability to identify different
prospects’ different reactions to incentives.

Therefore, in this study, acquisition rate is regarded not only as a function of acquisition
spending but also as a function of ability to differentiate customers, or in the context of
this research, the ability to incentive-discriminate. In addition, since a company can
choose to increase its level of spending in “predictive modeling” or “analytics” to
improve the ability to incentive-discriminate, this ability becomes a function of analytics
spending. From a company decision maker’s point of view, to improve the acquisition
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rate, the company can spend money on both the incentives, which attracts prospects to
become customers, and the analytics, which allows the company to target the incentives
to certain customers. The question is: how much to spend on each of the above two
items?

Also, there are seemingly contradictions between theory and practice. For example, the
prevailing notion in CRM about customer acquisition and retention is that it costs 5 to 10
times more to acquire a new customer than to retain an existing customer. Despite this
common knowledge, many companies are still characterized as “not spending enough” on
retention.

In summary, this study seeks to answer the following questions:
•

Given a customer pool and distributions of customer switching costs, what will be
the optimal allocation of acquisition incentive spending vs. retention incentive
spending vs. analytics spending, so that the total cost of the above three is
minimized?

•

Under what conditions there will be such situation that any combination of the
following is true: the optimal acquisition incentive is zero (or non-zero), the
optimal retention incentive is zero (or non-zero), and the optimal analytics
spending is zero (or non-zero)?

•

Also, practically, why is there a gap between the theoretical expectation of
allocating more money on retention, and the observed behavior in practice that
companies are not spending enough on retention? Does this mean it would be
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cost-efficient for a company to allocate more of its resources to retention than to
acquisition?

To summarize, what separates this research from the previous ones is that in this
research, acquisition rate is not only a function of incentive amount, but also a function of
ability to incentive-discriminate. In addition, the ability to incentive-discriminate is a
function of analytics spending. The result of this research will help the marketing
decision makers to optimally balance the resources between incentives and analytics
spending.

3.2 Model Framework
In this section, the setting in which the model on acquisition and retention incentives is
operated is established. Types of switching costs are examined and a time-based
definition of acquisition and retention is proposed. The following terms will be defined
or discussed:
•

Switching cost

•

Distinction between acquisition and retention

•

Conditions for Acquisition and Retention

3.2.1 Switching Costs
Types of Switching Costs
Natural Switching Cost and Artificial Switching Cost
Based on whether they can be controlled or manipulated by a company in the short run,
switching costs can be put into two categories. The “natural” switching cost is a
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function of technology and customer’s individual preferences, etc. The “artificial” or
“contractual” switching cost (Klemperer, 1987) is usually controllable by the company
through, for instance, contracts and early termination penalties. The significance of this
categorization to the current study is that a company can use the following two means to
influence the customers’ switching decisions:
1) Control the artificial switching costs.
2) Predict prospects/customers’ natural switching costs and act accordingly
(incentive discrimination).
Switching-in Cost vs. Switching-out Cost
A switching-in cost is a switching cost that is incurred to a prospect when he becomes a
customer of the company. The natural switching-in costs are, for example, costs of
learning the new store layouts, learning the operation of new machines, and filling the
account application, etc. The artificial switching-in cost may include initiation fees a
health club charges, for example.
A switching-out cost is a switching cost to the customer if he defects. Money, time, and
efforts spent on learning the layout of a competitor’s store and the operation of a
competitor’s machines are natural switching-out costs. Early termination penalty is a
typical example of an artificial switching-out cost.
Types of Customers and Their Related Switching Costs
The magnitude of switching-in cost is associated with the status of the prospect. A
competitors customer usually has higher switching-in cost than an at-large prospect.
The three types of customers are different in their switching cost characteristics as listed
in Table 3.
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3.2.2 Acquisition and Retention
Switching-Cost-Based Definition of Acquisition and Retention
Acquisition
In the current study, in addition to the apparent condition that an acquisition is when a
non-customer becomes a customer of the company, the following criterion must also be
met for a customer to become an acquisition:
There is a significant switching cost present or created.
This criterion ensures that an “acquired” customer is more than just a person who bought
some products or services from the company. As discussed in Chapter 1, one critical
justification for offering incentive (instead of simple price discount) is the existence or
creation of switching cost. Based on this criterion, a person who stops by a grocery store
to get a snack on his long-distance drive across the country is only a customer, but not an
acquisition because there is no switching cost involved. In other words, since this
customer will stop at almost any other store for his next stop freely and without any
burdens (of switching cost), he is not an acquisition.

How large does the switching cost have to be to qualify for being “significant”?
Quantitatively, we can use the ratio between switching cost and per-period revenue or
profit to gauge how “significant” the switching cost is. For example, if a one-year cell
phone contract comes with a $50 incentive and $150 early termination penalty, and the
average profit per month is $30, assuming no “natural” switching costs, then the ratio is

30

(150-50)/30=3.3. Therefore, one can define a switching-cost-to-profit-margin ratio of,
for example, 2 or higher as being a “significant” switching cost.

Retention
Retention is similarly defined as keeping an existing customer while creating or
maintaining a significant switching cost. The difference between retention and
acquisition is that when a prospect accepts an acquisition incentive, his net switching-in
cost is lowers; when a customer accepts a retention incentive, his net switching-out cost
is raised.

Time-based Definition of Acquisition and Retention
Sometimes the line between acquisition and retention is rather vague. For example, in
the following case:
Pricing for Wireless Phones with Different Length of Contract
Term of the
Contract
Phone Pricing

No contract
$344

One-year
contract
$294

Two-year
contract
$219

We can see that a one-year contract will have a saving of $50 over a no-contract plan, and
a two-year contract will save $125 over a no-contract plan. As shown in the above
example, different plans (no contract, one-year, or two-year) provide different amount of
incentives. The longer the term, the higher the incentive is. How do we distinguish
between an incentive that keeps the customer for one year and one that keeps the
customer for two years? Are they both acquisition incentives? How should we evaluate
between incentives that have different duration of impact?
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As discussed in Chapter 1, switching cost is a necessary condition for offering incentives.
In addition, I have also reasoned that a significant switching cost is a necessary condition
for an acquisition. In this section, I will further develop the understanding of acquisition
and retention and will form a time-based definition. The essence of time-based
definition is still built on the switching-cost-based except that it emphasizes the time
effect of switching cost. The rationale is that a significant switching cost often results in
the customer’s staying for a significant length of time. Put it differently, a significant
switching cost will increase the probability that a customer will stay for a longer period
of time. There can be two ways for the switching cost to prevent the customer from
defecting too early. One is the natural switching cost: a customer simply will incur a lot
of these costs if he switches frequently. The other is certain costs the company imposes,
such as early termination penalty. Both types of the costs discourage customers from
switching too early or too often. Because of the connection between switching cost and
the expected length of stay, a time-based definition of acquisition and retention is actually
an extension of the switching-cost-based definition.

Based on the above reasoning, the switching-cost-based definition of acquisition and
retention can be extended as:
Acquisition is when a non-customer becomes a customer with a significant switching-out
cost attached and this switching-out cost usually prevents the new customer from
defecting before completing a stay of a significant length of time.
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Retention is keeping an existing customer with a significant switching-out cost and this
switching-out cost usually prevents the existing customer from defecting before
completing a stay of a significant length of time.

In the example above, a one-year contract will save the consumer $50, and a two-year
contract will save $125. So some people might think both the $50 and the $125 are
acquisition incentives. However, the $125 is actually a retention incentive as well.
Using the time-based definition, we can distinguish between acquisition incentives and
retention incentives under these situations.

As discussed earlier, a necessary condition for a price discount to become an acquisition
or retention incentive is the existence of a significant switching cost. For a 1-year
contract, the $50 incentive is the acquisition incentive because it creates a significant
switching cost in the form of an early-termination penalty and therefore raises the
probability that customers will join and stay for one year.

Is the $125 incentive for a 2-year contract also an acquisition incentive? This question
can be answered by comparing a one-year contract with a two-year contract. A two-year
contract can be treated as a one-year contract offered to a new customer followed by a
one-year contract offered to an existing customer. Therefore, the incentives
accompanying a two-year contract is a mixture of acquisition incentive and retention
incentive. From a time-based perspective, if we define a “significant length of time” as
one year, then the completion of a one-year period is considered a successful acquisition
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and any time period past one year should be regarded as retention. Therefore, the $125
is a mixed incentive that contains an acquisition incentive of $50 and a “pre-installed”
retention incentive of $75. The $75 is a retention incentive because it raises the
probability that customers will stay for an additional year after the first year is completed.
(This is also an example of the difference between the time when incentives are
administered and the time when incentives take effect. Specifically, in this case, the
function of retention of the second year is actually performed when the acquisition is
made.)

If one fails to recognize that an incentive on a two-year contract is actually composed of
more retention incentive than acquisition incentive ($75 vs. $50) instead of only
acquisition incentive ($125), he may mistakenly believe that the company spends more
money on acquisition than retention. When retention cost is mistaken as acquisition
cost, it will also add unjustified support to the notion of “companies spend more money
on acquisition than retention”.

To summarize, for contract of longer periods, by identifying the effects of incentives
based on the “time-based” approach, one can distinguish retention incentives from
acquisition incentives.

3.2.3 Conditions for Switching
In this section, the variables and the criteria for accomplishing acquisitions and retentions
are stated. The goal is to establish a logical and quantitative link between switching
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cost, switching cost distributions, incentives offered, and the outcomes of incentives, i.e.,
whether the customer is acquired/retained or not.

Reasons for Differences in Switching Cost among Different Individuals
Differences in consumer preferences will affect the way a customer evaluates a
product/service and its values. Besides the differences in preferences about the products
and services themselves, different risk tolerance and time discount also contribute to the
differences in switching cost. For example, people with high risk tolerance would
perceive the switching to a new product or seller less risky and have lower switching cost
than people with low risk tolerance. Also, people who have higher time discount rates
will perceive incentives are more valuable than those with low time discount rates.
Therefore, the differences in switching cost among different individuals can be
summarized as the differences in their respective “risk-adjusted net present values”.

Conditions for Accomplishing Acquisition and Retention
Conditions for Acquisition of Competitors’ Customers
Assuming that both the firm and its competitors offer identical services or products, the
acquisition of a competitor’s customer will be accomplished if net switching cost is less
than zero, or equivalently, the acquisition incentive is larger than his switching cost.
(The switching cost used in this research refers to the net switching cost after adjusted for
any benefit but before applying the incentives. This will allow fair comparison when
there is difference in quality or features between two firms’ services or product. The
difference can be expressed as a money-equivalent and be accounted into the calculation
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of total switching cost. For example, in their study about wireless customer switching
behavior, Shi et al (2002) demonstrates that larger networks offers more benefit than
smaller networks by virtue of higher possibility of in-network calls. If in this case, the
direct monetary value of the switching cost without accounting for the differences in
network size is $100 and the new company’s larger network is equivalent to $30, then the
net switching cost is $100-$30=$70.)
Therefore, for competitors’ customers:
If acquisition incentive > switching cost, then the customer is acquired.

Conditions for Acquisition of At-large Customers
Since at-large customers are not current users of a service or a product, switching cost
will be defined as the perceived differences between the firm and its competitor. For
example, if for the same price, the customer perceives firm A and B as offering values of
$200 and $150 respectively, then the “switching cost” for becoming B’s customer is $50.
Therefore, an incentive of $50 or more from firm B is necessary to attract this customer.
So, for at-large customers:
If acquisition incentive > switching cost, then the customer is acquired.

Conditions for Retention of Existing Customers
The purpose of retention incentives can be regarded as increasing effectively the total
cost of switching. For example, if the switching cost (without retention incentives) is
$100 and the benefit the competitor’s offering is $120, then the customer has a negative
net switching cost (or positive switching benefit) of $20 and will defect. However, if a
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$50 retention incentive is provided, then it more than offsets the switching benefit,
making switching unattractive. In fact, the minimum incentive necessary to retain the
customer is: Benefits form the Competitor – Switching Cost = $120 - $100 = $20.
Therefore, for existing customers:
If retention incentive> net switching benefit, then the customer is retained.

“Number Acquired” and “Number Retained”
The number of prospects acquired is a function of acquisition incentives. The higher the
acquisition incentive (per person) is, the higher the number of prospect customers can be
attracted. In most of the previous studies, s-shaped curve functions are used to describe
acquisition rate (number acquired divided by total number of prospects). However, if
customer switching cost function can be described as a known distribution, e.g., normal
or uniform, and the parameters of the distributions are known (or assumed, as in this
study), then the acquisition rate function can be derived directly as cumulative
distribution of the switching cost function. For instance, when the preference
distribution is a normal curve, its corresponding cumulative distribution function (cdf) is
an s-shaped curve. When the preference follows a uniform distribution, the cdf, and the
acquisition rate function is a straight line with an up-ward slope.

(In addition to the amount of incentives, there are other factors affecting a particular
consumer’s switching/staying decisions. For example, Feinberg et al (2002) argue that
consumers’ reaction to firm’s promotional offers is affected not only by the offer the
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consumers themselves receive but also the offers available to others. In this study, I will
assume that this effect be negligible.)

Example
This example will illustrate how customer preferences and the amount of incentive
offered determine the acquisition rate.
Assuming everything else being constant, customers’ switching cost distribution is
determined by their preferences. If we know the preference distribution and
consequently the switching cost distribution, then we can calculate the acquisition rate
given the amount of incentives offered. For example, if there are 10 customers, and their
switching costs are $1, $2, … $10 respectively, then the switching cost distribution is
known. And if the company’s incentive offering is $8 per person, then by applying the
acquisition condition: “If acquisition incentive > switching cost, then the customer is
acquired”, we can see that eight customers, those whose switching cost are less than or
equal to $8, will be acquired. Therefore the acquisition rate is 8/10=80%.
Mathematically, if we express the switching cost distribution as F, then the acquisition
rate is the cumulative distribution of F divided by the total number of customers.

3.2.4 Time Periods
In this section, time period for the administration of the incentives and the time period for
the effects of the incentives are distinguished.
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Time Period for The Actions of Giving Acquisition/Retention Incentives
Incentives can be administered on either a continuous basis or a discrete basis.
Regardless of which format it takes, in this study, the amount of incentive is defined as
the aggregated sum of incentives in a given period of time. For example, when the
incentive amount is needed for evaluating/comparing the effectiveness of acquisition
incentives and retention incentives, one can use one month (or one quarter, etc) as the
time frame for aggregating incentives.

Time Period for the Effects of Acquisition/Retention
Sometimes the duration of the effects of acquisition/retention is very close to the duration
that incentives are administered. For example, many credit cards accrue bonus points on
a monthly basis continuously and the effects of retention can be regarded as extending the
tenure month-by-month. However, the effects of acquisition/retention do not necessarily
match the length of time the incentive is administered. For example, in a marketing
campaign of one week, a one-time incentive provided on a cell phone service contract
can effectively retain the customer for an additional year.

Time Periods in the Current Study
Without losing its generality, a shorter length of time period for administrating incentive
and a longer one for the effects of incentives are used respectively. Specifically, I will
choose to use a period of one month as the length of time for incentives administration,
i.e., both the acquisition incentives and the retention incentives, are calculated or
aggregated respectively on a monthly basis. I will then choose to use a period of one
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year as the length of time for the effects of acquisition and retention, i.e., a customer
acquired or retained is defined as a customer who will at least stay with the company for
one year or one additional year.
To summarize, in this study, the acquisition incentive is the cumulative amount of
acquisition incentives that is administered in a month and it raises the probability of noncustomers joining and staying for one year.
The retention incentive is the cumulative amount administered in a month and it raises
the probability of existing customers staying for another year.

3.2.5 Summary of the Model Framework
To facilitate a clear understanding of the terms used in this study, a table of definition is
provided in Table 4. As discussed in the above paragraph, I will use one month as the
time period on which the administration of the incentives is measured.

One-time Customer vs. Acquisition vs. Retention
The distinction between a customer, acquisition, and retention is summarized as follows:
•

A one-time customer is NOT an acquisition.

•

An acquisition is achieved when a prospect becomes a customer and a significant
switching-out cost (natural or artificial) is accompanied. As a result of this
switching cost, the probability that customer will stay for at least a minimum
length of time with the company is raised.

•

A retention is achieved when an existing customer extends his tenure with the
company and a significant switching-out cost is accompanied.
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•

Retention incentives can be offered to prospects as well. For an incentive offered
to a prospect, if the accompanying contract imposes more than the minimum
length of time requirement that qualifies it as an acquisition, then it is a mixed
incentive, meaning that one part of it is acquisition incentive and the other part of
it is retention incentive.

The advantages of the “time-based definition” of acquisition and retention
•

Prevents certain “pre-paid” retention cost from being mis-labeled and miscategorized as acquisition cost. This can clarify some of the confusions that
result in claiming that more money is spent on acquisition than retention.

•

Provides a method of cost accounting that truly reflects the true effects of the
acquisition incentives vs. that of retention incentives.

•

Provides a tool to decompose mixed incentives and compare incentives of
different effective durations.

Summary of Model Framework
•

A customer’s decision of whether to switch is dependent on the level of his
switching cost and the level of incentives.

•

There are two types of switching costs: natural and artificial.

•

The level of natural switching cost is a function of the technology, regulation,
customer’s preferences, etc. The natural switching cost is usually not
controllable by the firm in the short run, or, at least, not controllable by the
marketing function of the firm.
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•

The natural switching costs vary among customers or prospects.

•

The level of artificial switching cost is mainly controllable by the firm.

•

A prospect will be acquired if the incentive offered is no less than his switching
cost.

•

An existing customer is retained if the incentive offered is no less than his
switching benefit.

•

Customer acquisition rate is a function of customer preference distribution
(therefore the switching cost distribution) and the incentive level per customer.

This framework is illustrated as Figure 1.

The firm can influence customer’s switching decision by controlling or managing
incentives and artificial switching cost, as well as predicting customer’s preferences.
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3.3 Free Riders
3.3.1 Definition and Examples of Free Riders
In the last section, I illustrated the effects of ability to incentive-discriminate customers
on acquisition and retention incentives allocation. A natural follow-up question will be
“Under what circumstances is it optimal to offer acquisition incentives, retention
incentives, or both?” In addition, “Given a certain level of ability to discriminate its
prospect customers and a certain level of ability to discriminate its existing customers
respectively, what will be the optimal acquisition incentive amount and retention
incentive amount?” To answer the above questions, in this section, I will first introduce
the concept of “Free Riders” in acquisition and retention process.

Background and Definition
In economics, the term “free rider” with respect to public goods or collective goods is
used to describe people or groups who do not contribute their shares but still benefit from
the public goods offered (Samuelson, P.A. 1954). The benefit is also considered
“positive externalities”, meaning that it is unaccounted for by the pricing system.
Although the term “free riders” does not necessarily imply that they ride for free
intentionally or deliberately, there is a strong incentive for individuals to misrepresent
their true marginal utility for a public good in a game theoretic setting.

The term “free rider” has also been used in many other areas as well. For example, in
international trade, World Trade Organization defines free-rider as a “country that does
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not make any trade concessions but profits, nonetheless from tariff cuts and concessions
made by other countries negotiating under the most-favored nation principle.” In
electric utility industry, providers have difficulty implementing different pricing for
different levels of reliability because the customer and its neighbors all connect to the
same power line and therefore all sign up for the lowest reliability plan, hoping to freeride off their neighbors (Brown & Marshall, 2001).

In marketing, “free-riders” often refers to those consumers who take advantage of
services (that are often free) offered by one company (or marketing channel) but make
the purchase from another company (a competitor) or channel. For example, a consumer
can go to company A’s store or website to learn about a product and then place an order
from company B for lower prices.

Therefore, these consumers are free-riding off

company A’s services. (Company B can also be regarded as free riding off company A
because it benefits from company A’s services without paying for it.) A second example
would be that when a company has two marketing channels, for example, “brick and
mortar” and “internet”. The “brick and mortar” offers more services such as product
demonstration by salespersons, but at a higher price than the “internet” channel. A
consumer can free-ride if he gets the product demonstration in “brick and mortar” but
buys it from the “internet” for less. Wu et al (2004) studied the implication of free
riding in e-commerce.

Same as the cases of free-riding on public goods, the free-riders on acquisition incentives
and retention incentives do not necessarily hide their marginal utility (or propensity)
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deliberately. However, they “free-ride” by taking the incentives that are not intended for
them. It is the job of the companies and marketing professionals to identify and reduce
these free-riders because doing so will not only improve the profit from a company’s
perspective but also will improve efficiency from an economy’s perspective. The term
“free-riders” defined in this study takes the meaning of “hidden preferences” and “taking
the benefit that is not intended for them”.

Examples
In this study, I propose the concept of “free-riders” in the setting of customer acquisition
and retention. Some examples of free-riders in this setting are: 1) a consumer who will
buy a product anyway but still takes an incentive offer that is meant for enticing
undecided customers; 2) a cell phone user who will renew the service contract anyway
but still receives renewal incentives; 3) a new home owner who is ready to install a cable
TV service takes advantages of the incentive offer aimed at inducing satellite subscribers
to switch. In these cases, consumers free-ride on incentive offers. Incentives spent on
these free-riders are “wasted” because they will purchase the product or service even
without the incentives.

Free-rider Characterized in the Context of Switching Cost and Incentives
This section characterizes free-rider in the contexts of switching cost and incentives as
they were defined earlier this chapter. The motivation of doing so is to regard free-riders
as special cases of customers or prospects with certain characteristics.
Free-rider in Acquisition
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A free rider in acquisition is someone whose net switching-in cost is very low or less than
zero. For example, a new home owner who is very eager to sign up a cable TV service
is equivalent of having very low switching costs. As discussed earlier, if net switching
cost is less than zero, then the customer is acquired. Therefore, for a customer like this,
an incentive will be a “waste” of money and will allow the free rider to free-ride.
Apparently, the rule for efficient use of acquisition incentive is: The lower the switchingin cost is, the lower the acquisition incentive is needed. For free riders, the best strategy
is to offer them no incentives.
The more effective and efficient use of acquisition incentives includes:
1) Discriminate: identify each customer’s natural switching-in cost. Offer
incentives only enough to offset their switching-in costs.
2) Attract customers whose natural switching-in cost are lower. (However, it has
been realized that some low-switching-cost customers can also have low
switching-out cost, making it difficult to retain them.)
3) Decrease their artificial switching-in cost. For example, new cell phone carriers
welcomed the regulation of cell phone number portability, which allowed cell
phone number to be kept by the consumer even when they switch carriers.

Free-riders in Retention
A free rider in retention is someone whose switching-out cost is very high. Even
without being offered any incentives, these customers will still not defect. A retention
incentive offered to them creates free-riding. For example, a discount on a two-year cell
phone contract for people who consider switching carrier “not worth the trouble” will
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result in free-riding of the retention incentives. Another example is a renewal incentive
offered to a user who does not intend to switch at all.
Therefore, the strategy of efficient retention incentive is: The higher the switching-out
cost is, the lower the retention incentive is needed.
The company can take the following measures to improve effectiveness:
1) Discriminate: identify each customer’s natural switching-out cost. Offer
incentives only to those with low switching-out costs.
2) Attract customers whose natural switching-out cost are higher. (Note:
Actually, if a customer’s switching-out cost is negligible, then the customer is
not considered an acquisition by definition used in this research.)
3) Increase the artificial portion of switching-out cost. (Note: This is often the
result of customer receiving retention incentive in exchange of a contracted
early termination penalty. However, non-contractual ways of increasing
artificial switching cost can also be implemented, e.g., increased
services/features such as bank’s on-line bill-pay.)

3.3.2 Summary
The following table summarizes the definition of free rider and non free rider in
acquisition and retention, as well as the conditions (in terms of incentives) need for being
acquired or retained.

The Figure 2 illustrates the switching-cost based definition of free rider, the criterion for
acquisition, and the effect of acquisition incentives.
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The Figure 3 illustrates the switching-cost based definition of free rider, the criterion for
retention, and the effect of retention incentives.

In this study, we assume that the pool of prospects and the pool of existing customers, as
well as switching cost distribution, and the number of free riders in prospect and existing
customers are exogenous, i.e., the company can neither change the characteristics of its
prospects or customers, nor can it manipulate the switching cost.
The only measure that the companies can take is to try to incentive-discriminate, i.e., to
identify free riders and prevent them from receiving incentives.

3.4 Incentive Discrimination and Its Effects
3.4.1 Incentive-Discrimination
In the context of acquisition and retention free riders discussed above, incentivediscrimination in this model is defined as the ability to distinguish free riders from non
free riders. This ability can be mathematically expressed as the percentage of free riders
that the company can identify. A company without such ability will be able to identify
0% of the free riders. A company with a perfect ability will be able to identify 100% of
the free riders.
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3.4.2 The “Targeting” Effect of Incentive-Discrimination
When a company can incentive-discriminate, it can make “targeted” offers to certain
prospects/customers, and save money as a result. For example, in customer acquisition,
if a company is not able to incentive-discriminate, it has to offer all prospects incentives.
However, if the company has the ability to incentive-discriminate, it only needs to give
incentive offers to non free riders. This will 1) reduce promotion/marketing costs, e.g.,
mailing cost, by only sending the offers to the customers whose decisions will be swayed
by the incentives, and 2) reduce incentive costs by only giving incentives to these
customers (non free riders). Therefore, when a company can incentive-discriminate, the
marketing cost and acquisition cost will be less than that when it cannot discriminate.

3.4.3 The “Favoring” Effect of Incentive-Discrimination on Acquisition and
Retention Incentive Allocation
Another effect of incentive-discrimination is that it can affect the optimal allocation of
money between acquisition incentive and retention incentive.
Suppose that a company has 100 existing customers whose retention costs follow a
uniform distribution ranging from -$20 to $80 in $1 increment, if the company would like
to allocate all its money on retention, then to retain 90 of them, without any ability to
discriminate, the company would need to offer an incentive of $70 per person to
everyone. The total cost of retaining 90 customers is $70*90=$6300.

Also suppose that it has 300 prospects whose acquisition costs follow a uniform
distribution ranging from -$20 to $80 in $1 increment, If the company would like to
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spend all its money on acquisition, then to attract 90 of them, with the knowledge of who
the free riders are, the company will have a significant advantage. Realizing that even
without offering any incentives, there will still be 20% (or 60) of the prospects joining the
company because they are free riders (whose switching cost is less than zero), the
company would only need to offer $10 per person to the non free riders. This would
attract an additional 30 prospects. The total cost of acquiring 90 prospects is
$10*30=$3000.

The result shows that it is better for the company to spend money on acquisition than
retention. This is the case because the ability to identify free riders makes it more
efficient to provide more incentives to acquisition than retention. In other words, the
relative strength of the ability to incentive-discriminate in acquisition makes it more
favorable to spend on acquisition.

3.4.4 Discussion
From the above examples, we can observe that: first, it is possible that spending money
on acquiring new customers can be just as effective as retaining existing ones; second,
the optimal allocation between acquisition and retention depends on customer preferences
and incentive-discrimination on both the acquisition and the retention. In other words,
we have a preliminary answer to the questions raised at the beginning of this chapter,
e.g., whether or not to spend money on acquisition incentives or retention incentives, or
both. The answer is that the optimal allocation will depend on the following factors:
•

Existing customers’ preferences
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•

Prospects’ preferences

•

Ability to differentiate existing customers

•

Ability to differentiate prospects

This also proves that the popular belief that retaining customer is less expensive than
acquiring customer is not always true. First of all, the assumptions about the retention
cost and acquisition cost refer to average costs. If we take existing customers as a whole
and the prospects as a whole, then it is generally true that the average retention cost per
existing customer is much less than the average acquisition cost per prospect. However,
it is important to point out that not all existing customers are equal in terms of retention
reservation price. The same is true for prospect customers, i.e., not all prospects have
the same switching costs.

Therefore, although on average, it is more costly to acquire a new customer than to retain
an old customer, at the individual level, it is possible that it is less costly to acquire a
particular new customer than to retain a particular existing customer. The key is to
identify those particular new customers, specifically, those new customers with low
acquisition costs. The example also shows that to provide more conclusive answers to
the questions raised in the beginning of the chapter, a more systematic way of studying
the quantitative relations between the factors and the outcomes is needed.
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Chapter 4: Methodology: Mathematical Model
4.1 Why Mathematical Model?
As stated in Chapter 3, the central question this study will answer is: Given a customer
pool, a customer preference distribution for acquisition and retention, what will be the
optimal level of acquisition spending vs. retention spending vs. analytics spending, so
that profit is maximized?
The above question requires the study of the determinants of optimal incentive decisions
and the solution in a quantitative manner. Therefore, to study the effects of these
determinants quantitatively, a mathematical model is suitable. A mathematical model
uses mathematical variables and functions to describe the relations it represents. The
real-world factors/determinants that affect the outcome are represented by mathematical
variables in the model. The relations between the factors are represented by
mathematical functions. Not only that the research question makes it necessary for us to
employ a mathematical model, but also that the knowledge of the variables, function
forms, or the properties of the relations between variables makes it feasible to construct
such a model. For example, as discussed in Chapter 3, the condition for switching can
be clearly expressed mathematically, i.e., the relation between number of free riders
identified and the analytics spending can be expressed in mathematical functions that are
consistent with the property of diminishing returns. Therefore, all of the above
knowledge about the mathematical relations between variables affords us the feasibility
of formulating a mathematical model.
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4.2 Mathematical Model vs. Other Methods
Besides mathematical model, other methods such as numerical optimization and survey
research have also been used in the study of business/marketing decisions. However,
mathematical model has its unique advantages over other methods. Mathematical model
is very suitable for solving optimization problems because of it uses clearly defined
mathematical functions. Comparing to numerical optimization method such as some
software packages, mathematical model has its advantages in that it provides not only the
result of an optimal solution, but also a transparent mapping of the relations between the
parameters and the outcome. It is also possible to reach a closed-form solution, which
the numerical optimization usually cannot.
The advantages of mathematical model over survey method also lies in its explicit
expression of the relationship between variables. Also, because mathematical models’
clear and concise representation of the relations, and its flexibility for modification and
revision, as well as its ability to perform what-if analysis, it is more advantageous to
utilize this method whenever the conditions allow.

(However, the use of mathematical model in solving an optimization problem does not
necessarily exclude the use of numerical optimization or survey, etc. In fact, when
certain types of problems or certain assumptions/relations of the problems make it too
complex to interpret a mathematical model, numerical optimization should be used
instead. Also, survey method can provide the foundations on which the mathematical
models are built. For example, the assumed relationship between any two variables can
be modified, either in terms of function form, or in terms of parameter values, if the
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survey results demonstrate a different reality than the mathematical model had originally
portrayed.)

4.3 Relevance in Mathematical Representation
A good mathematical model should closely reflect the reality it abstracts from. In the
current research, the model is formulated based on the understanding of the concept and
the relations of the elements and factors in customer acquisition and retention.
Certainly, there are more than one way of mathematically expressing these concepts and
relationships, nevertheless, the analysis is robust enough to encompass variations. For
example, as we will see in the next chapter, the relationship between free riders identified
and the analytics spending is expressed in a quadratic function. The real-world function
might be different. However, the quadratic function captures the most important
properties of the relationship, such as the concavity, i.e., in this particular case, the
diminishing return of the analytics spending.

4.4 Advantages and Possible Future Expansions
One of the major advantages of utilizing a mathematical model is that we can plug in
different assumptions by changing different function forms or parameters. Using
mathematical model also makes it possible to expand the current model.

54

The current research built on the previous studies on optimal incentive allocation
( references here ), and can potentially be developed or modified into either part of a
larger model or a model with different assumptions on the detailed level. For example,
one of the assumptions of this model is that the price is already determined. An
expansion of the model can allow both price and incentives to change. Under that
situation, the number of free-riders will be a function of price, instead of an exogenous
variable in the current model. This can also allow us to study the optimal combination
of price and incentives, e.g., low-price-low-incentive or high-price-high-incentive. The
net price (price minus incentive) might be the same between the above two options, but
the effects are different because the effect of price and incentive are different (the highhigh combination is usually accompanied by a longer contract and is therefore more
“captive” than the low-low combination, for example.)

Another possible variation of the current model is to use exponential function, instead of
quadratic function, to describe the relations between analytics spending and the free
riders identified. Also, the customers’ and the prospects’ preferences distributions,
which are currently assumed to be uniform distributions, can be changed to other type of
distributions.

In summary, there are numerous possible expansions or variations of this model that
would afford the future researchers abundant opportunities for exploration and
improvement.
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Chapter 5: Base Model: Acquisition Incentive vs. Retention
Incentive
5.1 Model Formulation

In this section, I will propose a constrained optimization model, make certain
assumptions about the relationships and the parameters, and solve for the optimal level of
acquisition incentives and retention incentives.

Incentive-Discrimination
In the context of free riders discussed above, incentive-discrimination in this model is
defined as the ability to distinguish free riders from non free riders. Mathematically, it is
expressed as percentage of free riders that the company can identify. A company
without such ability will be able to identify 0% of the free riders. A company with
perfect ability will be able to identify 100% of the free riders.

Assumptions
There following assumptions are for the base model only. In the extended models,
assumption 4 will be changed.
Assumption 1 (Equal margin assumption): All customers, once acquired or retained,
make equal contribution to company’s profitability.
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Assumption 2 (Uniform distribution assumption): Customer reservation prices follow a
uniform distribution.
Assumption 3 (Linear function assumption): The acquisition rate and retention rate are
linear functions of acquisition incentives and retention incentives respectively.
(Consequently, the Marginal Acquisition Rate and Marginal Retention Rate, which are
the slopes of the acquisition rate and retention rate function, are constants.)
Assumption 4 (Cost components): The cost of acquisition incentives and retention
incentives are the only variable components of acquisition and retention cost. The cost
for devising the incentive-discrimination, administering and implementing the incentives
are excluded. The reason for this is that the base model is primarily concerned with the
allocation of incentives between acquisition and retention when discrimination is
involved. Therefore, other factors are treated as control variables or constants.

Problem Definition
For a corporate executive who is in charge of acquisition and retention functions, his goal
is to make decisions at the beginning of the month so as to reach/maintain a predetermined number of customers at the end of the month at the minimum costs. The predetermined number of customers is set by the corporation. At the executive’s disposal is
the allocation of incentive expenditure between acquisition and retention.
Therefore, this situation can be summarized as follows:

•

Objective: Minimizing Total Acquisition and Retention Expenditures
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•

Constraints: Maintaining a Predetermined Number of Total Customers at the End
of the Month

•

Decision Variable: Allocation of incentives

•

Parameters/Assumptions: As listed in the above sections.

5.2 Solving for Optimum
The above defined problem can be characterized as a constrained optimization problem.
Lagrange Multiplier method is used to solve this problem.
Variables and their definitions are listed in Table 6.

Note: the detailed discuss of r1 and r2 are in section 3.3.2.
The objective function v (sum of total acquisition expenditure and retention expenditure)
and constraint function u (sum of number of customers acquired and retained) are
formulated as follows:
Let u be the total cost of acquisition and retention, and v be the total number of
customers.
Since the total number of customers is composed of four groups:
•

the total number of free-riders among prospect customers acquired f1

•

the total number of non free-riders among prospect customers acquired g1

•

the total number of free-riders among existing customers retained f 2

•

the total number of non free-riders among existing customers retained g 2
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x1
r1

x2
r2

Therefore, v = f1 + g1

x1
x
+ f2 + g2 2 = C
r1
r2

Since the total expenditure is composed of the incentive costs for the above four groups
respectively, we have u = f 1 x1 +

g
g1 2
2
x1 + f 2 x 2 + 2 x 2
r2
r1

To set up Lagrange Multiplier, let

L = u − λ (v − K )
where λ is the Lagrange Multiplier.
Set partial derivatives of the above function equal to zero:
∂L
=0
∂x1
∂L
=0
∂x2
∂L
=0
∂λ

Solving the above equations, the optimal acquisition incentive ( x1 * ) and the optimal
retention incentive ( x1 * ) are:

λ=

r1 r2 (2c − f 1 − f 2 )
g 2 r1 + g1 r2

x1 * =
x2 * =

λg1 − f1 r1
2 g1

λg 2 − f 2 r2
2g 2

Therefore,
Æ x2 * = x1 * +

f1r1 f 2 r2
−
2 g1 2 g 2

59

5.3 Discussion: The Advantages and Disadvantages of Retention vs.
Acquisition

From a company’s perspective, although a typical existing customer usually has
switching cost advantages over a prospect, there are some disadvantages in implementing
retention incentives compared with acquisition incentives.

As it is shown in the above numeric example, when the free-riders are 15% of the
prospect customers and 50% of the existing customers, the company’s optimal strategy is
to offer $27.36 in acquisition incentives per person vs. $10.70 in retention incentives per
person. In this particular case, the optimal strategy is to give prospect customers about
two to three times the level of incentives offered to the existing customers.

If a company cannot detect whether a particular customer will churn or not, then it has to
offer the same retention incentives to all existing customers. The problem with this
situation is that there can be more existing customers who are not contemplating churning
than those who are. A blanket retention incentive will be “wasted” on these “free
riders”, customers who are not considering churning anyway.

On the acquisition side, however, an acquisition incentive will not be “wasted” on
customers who do not want to join because a customer cannot get the incentive unless he
signs up with the company.
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However, there are potential free riders in prospect customers as well - people who would
sign up anyway even without the incentive, in a competitive market, where the
competitions offer incentives, the number of these “wasted” acquisition offers would be
negligible. So in this sense, acquisition incentives are “naturally” more targeted than
retention incentive in that the former is much less likely given to the free riders than the
latter.

The above example also demonstrates that when there are significant free-riders, the
optimal allocation of retention and acquisition will shift. Although the reservation price
for an existing customer is often only a fraction of the reservation price for a prospect
customer, because the company cannot identify free-riders, any incentive given to this
existing customer will be offered to other customers (including free-riders) as well.
Therefore, the existence of free-riders dilutes the company’s retention efforts.

Since there are more free-riders in retention than in acquisition, the retention efforts are
more diluted than the acquisition efforts. This explains why many companies appear to
be “under-spending” on retention.

It is interesting to note that economists generally agree that free riders can bring the
following consequences, which are similar to the effects of free riders on retention:
1) Goods affected are under-produced. The presence of free riders diminishes the
company’s incentives for providing these goods and services, such as free website
information and review.
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2) As a result of the first consequence, the overall market demand will decrease
because of a lower level of information and confidence and a higher level of
uncertainty.
3) Market will be less efficient.

An important distinction must be made to avoid possible confusion. In early sections it
was stated that the companies usually have more information about their existing
customers than about the prospect customers. More information usually leads to a better
ability to incentive-discriminate. However, the reason why retention efforts have more
“waste” is that the process of acquisition has its “built-in” mechanism of self-screening,
i.e., only those who explicitly changed their status (from a prospect customer to a
customer) will receive the acquisition incentives. In retention, every existing customer
receives the retention incentives, whether he is considering leaving or not.

Sometimes companies can certainly give incentives only when a customer is in the
process of leaving. This would avoid giving incentives to the customers who are not
considering leaving. However, sometimes it is already too late when the customer has
already made the move, for example, signed contract with another provider. Another
issue is that the customer could be “bluffing” in order to get a better deal. This situation
belongs in the domain of game theory and will be briefly discussed in chapter 7 of this
dissertation.
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5.4 Summary - Levels of Discrimination and Consequences on
Acquisition/Retention with Free Riders

The optimal acquisition and retention incentive formula x2 = x1 +

f1r1 f 2 r2
−
shows
2 g1 2 g 2

that:
1) The relative level of optimal acquisition incentive and retention incentive depends on
the number of free riders among prospects and existing customers.
2) The relative level of optimal acquisition incentive and retention incentive depends on
the effectiveness of acquisition and retention incentives.
3) The higher the number of free riders in prospects, the lower the optimal acquisition
incentive per person, and vice versa.
4) The higher the effectiveness of acquisition incentive, the higher the optimal acquisition
incentives per person.

Since the number of free-riders is negatively related to the ability to incentive
discriminate, we can conclude that a better ability to discriminate (either a population of
prospect customers or existing customers) will increase the optimal spending on that
population.
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5.5 Consistency with LTV (Life-time Value) Model
The popular LTV model uses a multi-period approach, but the current research model
uses a one-period set-up. Is the conclusions drawn from this research consistent with the
popular LTV model’s calculation?
Yes, if the following assumptions are met. The first two assumptions are the common
assumptions used in LTV models (Gupta et al, 2003). The third assumption is part of
the base model.
1) Constant margin of a customer in the calculation of LTV of a customer: The
constant margin means that the profit margin remains the same from period to
period for the same customer.
2) Constant retention rate in the calculation of LTV of a customer: Although for a
particular customer, his retention rate for any period is either 0 or 1, to calculate
his LTV, which is actually an “expected” value of LTV, we use the portfolio’s
retention rate. So the constant retention rate is also with respect to time period,
meaning that the retention rate of the portfolio remains the same from one period
to the next.
3) Equal margin of customers in the base model: This is an assumption for the base
model only. Here, the “equal margin” means all customers have the same
amount of profit margin regardless whether he is a new customer or an existing
customer. The reason for this assumption is that it allows the customer
portfolio’s value to be represented by the number of customers in that portfolio
minus the cost of acquisition and retention. This will simplify the calculation
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involved and still maintain the model result’s reasonable robustness and its ability
to generalize.

Because the above assumptions are usually an adequate approximation to reality, the
conclusion drawn from the current research is valid under the LTV calculation. The
detailed proof is in Appendix I.
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Chapter 6: Extended Model: Optimizing Analytics Spending
and Incentive
6.1 Optimizing Analytics Spending
In the last section, the ability to incentive-discriminate customers is treated as exogenous.
The analysis answers the question of “how to optimally allocate money if the company
can only choose between acquisition incentives and retention incentives?” In this
section, we will add analytics spending to the above situation and the ability to incentivediscriminate is defined as a function of analytics spending. So the analysis will answer
the question of “how to optimally allocate money if the company can choose between
acquisition incentives, retention incentive, and analytics spending?”

A direct effect of analytics is the increased ability to differentiate customers. An
increase in analytics spending can usually improve the ability to differentiate/incentivediscriminate. However, because the effect of analytics spending varies from one project
to another, it is difficult to have a universal function form that describes the relationship
between money spent and the discrimination achieved. Nevertheless, on any specific
project, one can often obtain the cost and discrimination information about different
analytical methods.

6.2 Model Formulation
Variables and Units
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The variables used in this extended model are listed in Table 7.

The General Model and the Reduced Model

The general model, which examines the effects of the incentives and analytics spending,
includes the following four variables: acquisition incentive, retention incentive,
acquisition analytics spending, retention analytics spending. Assuming the total number
of the free riders in retention is fr, then the total cost is consisted of the following six
components: cost of incentive to acquisition free riders, cost of incentive to acquisition
non free riders, cost of incentive to retention free riders, cost of incentive to retention non
free riders, cost of acquisition analytics spending, and cost of retention analytics spending
respectively:
f1 x1

(m1 − z1 ) 2
m1

2

(m2 − z 2 ) 2 g 2 2
g1 2
+
+
x 2 + z1 + z 2
x1 + f r x 2
2
r2
r1
m2

Our preliminary testing on such a “general model” shows that it is not mathematically
tractable for closed form analysis, thus rendering the results almost uninterpretable.
Therefore, a “reduced” version, which assumes that retention analytics spending is a
constant and its effect is also a constant, is examined instead. Although holding the
retention analysis spending constant prevents us from examining the dynamic effects of
simultaneously changing acquisition analytics spending and retention analytics spending,
as the results show below, the “reduced” model still provides a satisfactory level of
insight into the interactions between analytics spending and incentives while maintaining
its generalizability despite the simplifying assumptions. In addition, this treatment
actually reflects many real-world situations, under which it is only possible for firms to
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vary the spending on analytics of either the acquisition or the retention side. For
example, since in many companies, acquisition analytics spending budget is usually
controlled by marketing department and retention analytics spending budget is controlled
by customer service department, it is realistic to assume that a company is only able to
control or change one of its analytics.

Since the only effect of retention analytics spending in the general model is to reduce the
retention free-riders, the effect of a constant retention analytics spending with a particular
number ( f r ) of unidentified retention free-riders is mathematically equivalent to the
effect of no analytics spending with a reduced number ( f 2 ) of total retention free-riders.
Therefore, the general model with a constant retention analytics spending is equivalent to
a reduced model with the following three variables: acquisition incentive, retention
incentives, and acquisition analytics spending. With this simplification, we have the
following cost function:
f1 x1

(m1 − z1 ) 2 g1 2
g
2
+ x1 + f 2 x2 + 2 x2 + z1
2
r1
r2
m1

For convenience, this research assumes that the retention analytics is a constant and the
only effect of analytics spending examined is that of acquisition analytics. Because of
the symmetry between acquisition and retention in this mathematical model, the result
and conclusion of the current analysis also applies to when the acquisition analytics
spending is a constant and the retention analytics spending is a variable.

The only

changes to the analysis and conclusion will be to switch all “acquisition” to “retention”.

68

The “reduced” form of the model will be examined in this study.

The Effect of Analytics Spending: Quadratic Function Form

In this study, the effect of analytics spending is characterized as the identification of freeriders among customers, or the reduction of unidentified free-riders. In general, the
more the company spends on analytics, the more free-rider it will be able to identify, and
the fewer free-riders will remain unidentified. Since there was no previous study about
the effects of analytics spending on the identification of free riders, there is no readily
available mathematical function form for the relation between analytics spending and
percent of free riders remaining or unidentified. However, by examining the situation I
propose the following properties for the mathematical relation between analytics
spending (z1) and the percent of free riders remaining (q):
1. A monotonically decreasing function. This is because the more money a firm
spends on analytics, the better the analytics will be, or the better the predictive
model predicts. As a result, more free riders will be identified and the free riders
remaining unidentified will be less.
2. q is equal to 100% when z1 is zero, and 0% when z1 is equal to m1. This means
that when no money is spent on analytics, no free riders will be identified. The
remaining free riders will be 100%. And if the company spends enough money
(m1), all free riders will be identified and the remaining free riders will be zero.
3. A diminishing return of the analytics spending. This means that if it is less costly
to identify the most apparent free riders than the least apparent ones. The law of
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diminishing returns is one of the common assumptions between the money or
resources allocated and the outcome of the input (Samuelson, 1954). Taking
retention of existing customers as an example, it is reasonable to assume the
diminishing return of analytics because the free riders with highest switching-out
costs are usually the easiest to identify. These customers usually exhibit
behaviors that are very “loyal” such as having long tenure and having purchases
of high quantities. However, the switching behavior of those whose switchingout cost is close to zero are usually more difficult to predict since they are
“borderline” free riders. More information and advanced analytical solutions are
usually required to identify these “less apparent” free riders, making it more
costly to identify them than the “more apparent” free riders.

The following function form satisfies the requirement of the properties of the relation
between analytics spending (z1) and percent free riders remaining unidentified (q) and it
has a simple function form.
q=

(m1 − z1 ) 2
2
m1

Where
q is the proportion of free-riders remaining (unidentified)
m1 is the “Analytics dollar required to identify all acquisition free-riders”
z1 is the “Analytics spending”

Another function form, an exponential function, was also examined. However, a
preliminary examination of the exponential form shows that the mathematical functions
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become too complex to reach a closed form solution. Therefore, since no theoretical or
empirical evidence is present to favor other function forms, and the quadratic form
maintains the feasibility of a closed form solution and in the meantime possesses the
desirable properties, it is chosen as the function form between free riders remaining
unidentified and the analytics spending.

The Figure 4 shows that when $100,000 spending on analytics is needed to identify all
free-riders (m1=$100,000), the effect of actual analytics spending z1 will have on the freeriders. For example, when the analytics spending is at $50,000, there will be 25% of the
free-riders remain unidentified.

Objective Function and Constraints

Since the goal of the company is to maintain a preset level of number of customers and
minimize the costs of acquiring and retaining these customers, we define the objective
function as the sum of the cost of acquisition incentives ( f1 x1

of the retention incentives ( f 2 x2 +

cost = f1 x1

(m1 − z1 ) 2 g1 2
+ x1 ), the cost
2
r1
m1

g2 2
x2 ), and the cost of the acquisition analytics (z1).
r2

(m1 − z1 ) 2 g1 2
g
2
+ x1 + f 2 x2 + 2 x2 + z1
2
r1
r2
m1

We define the constraints as the sum of total number of customers acquired
( f1 +

g1
g
x1 )and retained ( f 2 + 2 x2 ):
r1
r2

C = f1 +

g1
g
x1 + f 2 + 2 x2
r1
r2
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6.3 Analysis and Results
We have examined the effects of different m1 on the three other variables. The analysis
has directly answered the question of “what will be the optimal strategy, in terms of
spending on analytics, acquisition incentives, and retention incentives at different
difficulty levels of identifying free-riders?”

The above constrained optimization leads to a fourth degree function.

This function

shows that the total cost of incentives and analytics spending varies as the amount of
analytics spending varies. Also, for a given level of analytics spending (z1), there exists
an optimal combination of acquisition incentive (x1) and retention incentive (x2) that
minimizes the cost of incentives under this specific analytics spending. By varying the
amount of analytics spending, the optimal acquisition incentive and retention incentive
will also vary accordingly. The function allows us to solve for the optimal level of
analytics spending that minimizes the total cost of acquisition incentives, retention
incentive, and analytics spending.

Taking derivative of the above fourth degree function gives us a cubic function. The
cubic function is then solved and the conditions of the solution, the feasibility of the
solution, and the boundary conditions are examined.

Although there are many parameters in the model, the analysis primarily focuses on the
effect of the level of m on optimal strategies. The discussion of the extended model is
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structured in the level of m, the analytics spending required to identify all free-riders.
The range of m is divided into three regions: low, medium, and high.

In the following sections, I will examine the conditions and the behaviors of the analytics
spending, incentives, and the total cost in those three regions. Attention will also be
given to the two boundaries, or the thresholds, that separate the three regions. The
following analysis is based on the assumption that the budgeted total customer number is
not only greater than the total free-riders but also less than the total free-riders plus one
type of non-free-riders. These assumptions exclude any possibility that no spending on
analytics or incentives is necessary to fill the customer spots. In other words, we assume
that to meet the requirement of the budgeted total number of customers, there will need to
be some non free riders acquired or retained and there are enough non-free-riding
prospects or customers to fill the spots.

The analysis shows that when holding all other variables constant, the level of m will lead
to different patterns of optimal spending strategies.

6.3.1 The Three Regions of m
Three categories of m in its increasing order are: Low, Medium, and High. In business
languages, these categories correspond to increasing degrees of difficulty in identifying
free-riders. In terms of the amount of money that it requires to identify all free-riders,
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these respective three categories can be characterized as: less costly, moderately costly,
and very costly.

A Special Value: MH

The boundary between “moderately costly” and “very costly” analytics is expressed in
terms of a dollar amount MH. If m, “the amount of money that is required to identify all
free-riders”, is less than MH, then the analytics is “Moderately costly”. If m is greater
than MH, then the analytics is “Very costly”. The exact value of this amount MH can be
calculated by the following formula:
MH =

4( f 2 + 2(C − f 1 − f 2 )) 3 r1 f 1 g 1 r2

3

27( g 2 r1 + g 1 r2 ) 2 g 2

The ratios g2/r2 and g1/r1 represent the effectiveness of retention incentive and acquisition
incentive respectively. For example, if g1, the number of non free riders, is 10,000 and
r1, the maximum switching cost is $200, then the ratio g1/r1 is 50. This means that for a
$1 per person increase in acquisition incentive, there will be an additional 50 people
acquired. Similarly,

g2
can be regarded as the “effectiveness” of retention incentives.
r2

For example, in calculation of number of customers ( C = f1 +

g1
g
g
x1 + f 2 + 2 x2 ), 2 is
r1
r2
r2

the number of customers retained when each existing customer is given an incentive of
$1. Therefore, when the incentive per person is x2 ,

g2
x2 customers will be retained.
r2

We use notation e to represent this ratio. Therefore, by substituting e2 for g2/r2, and e1
for g1/r1, we have,
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MH =
=

=

4( f 2 + 2(C − f 1 − f 2 )) 3 r1 f 1 g 1 r2

3

27( g 2 r1 + g 1 r2 ) 2 g 2

4( f 2 + 2(C − f 1 − f 2 )) 3 f 1
1 1
3
27( + ) 2 e1 e 2
e1 e 2
4(2C − 2 f 1 − f 2 ) 3 f 1
1 1
3
27( + ) 2 e1 e 2
e1 e 2

Or, simply:

MH =

4(2C − 2 f 1 − f 2 ) 3 f 1
1 1
3
27( + ) 2 e1e2
e1 e2

The following are the descriptions of the three categories, both in mathematical terms and
in plain English.

Low m

In mathematical terms, when m is small enough to satisfy the condition: m ≤ M H , the
unconstrained z leads to a negative x2. Because the constraint is x2>=0 (no negative
incentives), the optimal z under this constraint, i.e., the constrained optimal z, is z0, which
is the value of z that minimizes the total cost when x2=0. The optimal solution under
this situation is: z= z0, x2=0, x1>0.

In plain English, this means that when it is “less costly” to identify the acquisition freeriders, the optimal strategy is to spend money on acquisition analytics (z>0) to identify
most of the free-riders. And since the identification of free-riders makes the acquisition
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incentives more effective, the firm should spend money on acquisition incentives (x1>0).
But since the retention incentive becomes relatively ineffective, no money should be
spent on retention incentives (x2=0).

Figure 5 shows that under the constraint of x2>=0, the total cost reaches its minimum
point when analytics spending is greater than zero – in this particular case, around
$10,000.

Medium m

Mathematically speaking, when m is still small enough to satisfy the condition m ≤ M H
but large enough to lead to an unconstrained x2 that is positive, the optimal z will be
determined by minimizing a fourth degree function subject to constraints. The local
minimum is found when the first derivative is zero and the second derivative is positive,
as in the point around $10,000 in the above graph.
The optimal solution is: z=z-optimal, x2>0, x1>0.

In plain English, this means that when it is “moderately costly” to identify the acquisition
free-riders, the optimal strategy is to spend some money on acquisition analytics (z>0),
some on acquisition incentives (x1>0), and some on retention incentive (x2>0).

Similar to the above case, the total cost is minimized with a positive analytics spending.
The z-and-total-cost graph for this case is similar to the one above.
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High m

Mathematically, when m is so large as to make m > M H , the optimal z is 0. x1 and x2 are
determined by the “base model” as described in sections a), b) and c) below.

In plain English, this means that when it is “very costly” to identify the acquisition freeriders, the optimal strategy is not to spend money on analytics (z=0). Instead, the money
will be better spent on acquisition incentive and retention incentives directly.
The amount spent on each incentive depends on the relative effectiveness of the two
incentives. Sometimes it is optimal to spend all on acquisition incentive; sometimes it is
optimal to spend all on retention incentives; sometime it is optimal to spend some on
each.

Figure 6 shows that when m is large, the unconstrained optimal z is negative. Therefore,
the boundary condition of z>=0 is applied. So when the analytics spending is zero, the
total cost is minimized.
a) Very Effective Retention Incentives
The ratio of g2/r2 to g1/r1 represents the relative effectiveness of the retention
incentives to that of the acquisition incentives. The higher this ratio is, the more
effective the retention incentive is relative to acquisition incentive.
If the ratio is greater than the value

(2c − f1 − f 2 ) − 1 , meaning that the retention
f1

incentive is very effective relative to acquisition incentive, then the optimal
strategy is to spend all money on retention incentives only (x1=0, x2>0).
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As Figure 7 shows, since the mathematically unconstrained optimal x1 is less than
zero, the boundary condition, x1=0, effectively becomes the best incentive level
that leads to the lowest total expenditure.

b) Moderately Effective Retention Incentives
If the ratio of g2/r2 to g1/r1 is between

(2c − f1 − f 2 ) − 1 ,
f2
and
(2c − f1 − f 2 ) − f 2
f1

meaning that the retention incentive is moderately effective relative to acquisition
incentive, then it is optimal to spend money on both the acquisition and retention
incentives (x1>0, x2>0).

As Figure 8 shows, the mathematically unconstrained optimal x1 is greater than
zero. Therefore, it is the optimal acquisition incentive.

c) Weakly Effective Retention Incentives
If the ratio is smaller than the value

f2
, meaning that retention
(2c − f1 − f 2 ) − f 2

incentive is not effective, then the optimal strategy is to spend money on
acquisition incentives only (x1>0, x2=0). This is shown in Figure 9.

6.3.2 The Boundaries
There are two boundaries separating the three regions discussed above. The first is the
boundary between “moderately costly” and “very costly” analytics. The threshold
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between “moderately costly” and “very costly” analytics is the value MH, which is given
by the following equation:

MH =

4(2C − 2 f 1 − f 2 ) 3 f 1
1 1
3
27( + ) 2 e1e2
e1 e2

Where e1 =

g1
g
and e2 = 2
r1
r2

The second is the boundary between “less costly” and “moderately costly” analytics
It is difficult to algebraically express this threshold in terms of the parameters C, f, and e
due to the complex function forms such as cubic and trigonometric functions. However,
this boundary point can be identified by the point at which the unconstrained retention
incentive (x2) becomes 0. (In the “less costly” region, the unconstrained x2 is always
less than 0. And in the “moderately costly” region, the unconstrained x2 is always greater
than 0.)

The m level that makes this point, ML, can be calculated through the use of “solver” or
other mathematical tools by solving the value of m1 that makes x2 equal to 0.
At this boundary point, the optimal analytics spending:
2

z0 = m1 −

m1 g1
2 f1 (C − f1 − f 2 )r1

The optimal acquisition incentive:

x1 =

C − f1 − f 2
r1
g1
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The optimal retention incentive:
x2 = 0

Table 8 summarizes the optimal strategy under the three regions in the increasing order of
m1 .

6.4 Interpretation of the Results and Discussions
6.4.1 Ceiling of the Acceptable Cost of Analytics
Since in formula M H =

4(2C − 2 f 1 − f 2 ) 3 f 1
, C is known, f and e can be estimated
1 1 2
3
27( + ) e1e2
e1 e2

from historical data, a firm can calculate the value MH. According to the analysis above,
when the cost of analytics required to identify all free riders (m1) is greater MH, the
optimal analytics spending (z1) is zero. Since m1 can usually be estimated by examining
the total cost of analytics project, including data gathering and predictive modeling, etc, a
company can evaluate how valuable the analytics will be. If the analytics is less
valuable (more expensive), then it makes it unfavorable for the firm to spend any money
on analytics. Since the value MH is determined by other parameters such as number of
free riders, its value marks the threshold above which the analytics will not be valuable
relative to incentives and therefore the firm should not spend on analytics. This provides
a very useful tool for evaluating the cost and benefit of analytical projects before the
project is started and the cost is incurred.
.
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6.4.2 The Effects of Free Riders and Effectiveness of Incentives
Section 6.3 examined the effects of m1, “the cost of analytics required to identify 100% of
the acquisition free riders”, has on the optimal spending between acquisition incentive
and retention incentive. In this section, I will examine how the optimal levels of
incentives and analytics spending are affected by other parameters such as number of free
riders and effectiveness of incentives.
Since the formula for the high-m boundary MH is:

MH =

4(2C − 2 f1 − f 2 ) 3 f1
1 1
3
27( + ) 2 e1e2
e1 e2

Where e1 =

g1
g
and e2 = 2
r1
r2

We can observe the following relations from the examination of the above equation:
1. When the number of acquisition free riders (f1) is at a critical value, (2C- f2)/8, MH
will be the highest. This means that analytics is most valuable (inexpensive) at
this point. Money spent on analytics will be more effective than that spent on
incentives. Therefore the optimal strategy is to allocate more money on
acquisition analytics.

However, when the number of free rider is either lower or

higher than this point, the analytics becomes less valuable (too expensive). On
the one hand, since the effect of acquisition analytics is to identify a percentage of
acquisition free riders, the more the free riders are, the more free riders will be
identified by the analytics, making the spending on analytics more effective.
When the number of acquisition free riders is lower, a lower amount of savings
will be realized from identifying these free riders. On the other hand, since free
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riders are those prospects who would still be acquired even without the incentives,
when the number of acquisition free riders becomes too large, the firm would not
need to direct its resources towards analytics and incentives and will still be able
to attract enough customers. Therefore, the analytics is more valuable when the
number of free riders is at an intermediate value. Too few or too many free
riders will make the analytics less valuable and result in less spending or even
zero spending on analytics.
2. If the number of retention free riders (f2) is sufficiently large, then MH will be
lower. This means that when there are a sufficiently large number of retention
free riders, the acquisition analytics is “very costly” relative to incentives and
therefore less valuable. The optimal strategy is to allocate little or no spending
on acquisition analytics.
3. If the acquisition incentive is sufficiently effective (a large enough e1 ), then MH
will be higher. This means that when the acquisition incentive is very effective,
the acquisition analytics becomes “less costly” or “moderately costly” relative to
incentives and it is more valuable. Therefore the optimal strategy is to spend
more on acquisition analytics. The reason for this is that if the acquisition
incentive is very effective, then it will be more cost-efficient for the company to
allocate its money to acquisition incentive. The acquisition analytics spending
further enhances this effectiveness.
4. If the retention incentive is sufficiently effective (a large enough e2 ), then MH
will be low. This means that the acquisition analytics is “very costly” relative to
incentives and it is less valuable. Therefore the optimal strategy is not to
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spending on acquisition analytics but allocate all spending on incentives. This is
the opposite case of the very effective acquisition incentive discussed above. So
the result is also opposite to the above case.

The above relations will provide managerial directions for marketing function of the
company to anticipate the changes in its target market, customer base, customer
characteristics, etc. For example, if a company anticipates a new customer group to
become part of the target market, and if this customer group can be characterized as
having fewer free-riders, then it might be prudent for the company to consider increasing
its spending in analytics, even if it was optimal for them not to do so before.

6.4.3 Other insights and observations
“Less costly” (low-m) vs. “Very costly” (high-m)

Although under both the “less costly” analytics (low-m) and the “very costly” analytics
(high-m) situations, the optimal retention incentive (x2) can be zero, the reasons are
somewhat different: For low-m, x2 is zero because a low-m makes it efficient to identify
f1, thereby increasing the relative effectiveness of and decreasing the relative
effectiveness of x2. Under the high-m, the optimal strategy is to spend nothing on
analytics (z). However, if even without the help of analytics, x1 is still highly effective
compared to x2, then the optimal x2 can also become zero.
“Less costly” (low-m) and “Moderately costly” (medium-m) vs. “Very costly” (highm):
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In “less costly” (low-m) and “moderately costly” (medium-m) cases, the spending on
analytics will help to make the incentive spending more cost effective, thus reducing the
total expenditure. In “very costly” (high-m) case, any spending on analytics will be less
effective than to give incentives to the customers directly, therefore the optimal is not to
spend on analytics.

6.5 Summary
By bringing in the effect of analytics spending into the model, we are able to examine
how the optimal allocation is affected by the “cost of analytics spending required to
identify all free riders”, “the number of free riders”, and “the effectiveness of incentives.”
The formula of the ceiling of the acceptable cost of analytics is derived. This would
enable the companies to better assess the financial aspect of their analytics projects.
Interpretation of other parameters provides managerial insight and directions on what the
spending on analytics should be when there is a change in the composition of customer
base or market competition.
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Chapter 7: Discussions
7.1 Summary of Contributions
This research makes contribution to the managerial science and its application in
marketing by providing new knowledge in the following aspects: Conceptually, this
research builds on the tradition of managerial sciences by taking a quantitative approach
to develop a new way of distinguishing key concepts involved in acquisition and
retention. First, it defines the difference between customer and acquisition by using the
amount of switching cost. Second, it distinguishes retention from acquisition by using
the duration of the contracts. Such treatment enables us to correctly identify acquisition
and retention and model them mathematically. In addition, this research is anchored in
the business practice by providing a practical interpretation of a phenomenon by
introducing the concept of “free rider” in acquisition and retention. Methodologically,
this research formulates a mathematical model that seeks the balance between reflecting
the reality and maintaining its relatively concise form and transparent interpretation of the
model and results. Mathematically, it analyzes the behavior and interaction between
incentives and analytics spending, and provides the boundary conditions under which the
following is true: the optimal acquisition incentive is zero (or non-zero), the optimal
retention incentive is zero (or non-zero), and the optimal analytics spending is zero (or
non-zero). The formula of the ceiling of the acceptable cost of analytics is derived.
This would enable the companies to better assess the financial aspect of their analytics
projects.
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7.2 Specific Contributions
7.2.1 Acquisition vs. Customer, Incentive vs. Discount
In previous studies, little attempt has been made to distinguish between a customer and
an acquisition. This research makes it clear that not all customers are acquisitions. The
emphasis on switching cost as a necessary component of acquisition (and retention) is an
important contribution of this research. With this definition of acquisition, i.e., “a
customer with a significant switching cost,” a marketing manager will not treat any
customers that are attracted by a price discount as an acquisition. In addition, the
definition of “significant” in the term “significant switching cost” opens the possibility
for future researches to use specific quantitative measures to define acquisition and
distinguish an acquisition from a customer. This distinction also encourages companies
to treat the customers with different switching costs differently.

7.2.2 Acquisition vs. Retention
Because in most of the cases, the difference between acquisition and retention is clear,
i.e., acquisition is when a prospect becomes a customer; retention is when an existing
customer remains a customer, there were no significant discussions devoted to the
distinction between the two. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, when the accuracy of
the amount of acquisition and retention incentives is important, and when there are
different contracts of different lengths and different discounts, it is crucial to make clear
distinctions between an acquisition, a retention, and a mixture of acquisition and
retention.

For example, the time-based definition of acquisition and retention, as
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proposed in this study, offers a clear and practical way of separating retention and
retention incentives from certain marketing offers such as a two-year contract, which is
essentially a mixture of acquisition and retention. This distinction is not only important
to the current study, but also is significant for any future studies that require correct
accounting of the amount of acquisition and retention incentives.

7.2.3 Free Rider
Another important contribution of this research is the introduction of the “free rider”
concept into the area of acquisition and retention. Not only does the free rider concept
put the prospects or customers into two categories, i.e., free riders and non free riders,
based on their switching costs, but also it can be expanded by incorporating game
perspective. For example, in future researches, one can study the scenario when
consumers play “game” with the company by masking their true preferences or engaging
in bluffing, etc. This would bring the study into the field of game theory.

7.2.4 Modeling
This research examines in detail the conditions under which the optimal strategy is to
have acquisition analytics spending, or retention incentive, or acquisition incentive, or a
combination of the three. More specifically, it identifies the link between the cost of
analytics, the effectiveness of the incentives, and the optimal allocation of money. This
would provide the marketing managers a tool to optimally allocate funds between
incentives and analytics spending.

87

7.3 Possible Future Research Directions
Many possible expansions can be built on the current research by modifying certain
assumptions or formulations. For example, instead of using the “number of free riders
identified” to operationalize the concept “incentive-discrimination”, in future researches,
one can use different measures such as Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics (Chakravart,
Laha, and Roy, 1967), which is often used in evaluating credit scoring models.
Additional attention can be paid to incorporating mis-classifications into the model, for
example, how to optimize analytics spending and incentive spending when the
effectiveness of analytics spending is expressed in not only the “number of free riders
identified,” but also the number of free riders or non free riders misclassified.

Another direction in the future research would be to conduct surveys or data analysis to
test and modify the current model. As discussed in Chapter 4, the mathematical
modeling method used in the current study can be modified or supplemented by other
methodologies.

There are several limitations or constraints in the current model that can be modified or
relaxed in the future researches. For example, one limitation of the current model is that
it defines the “incentive-discrimination” only as “identifying the free riders”. A more
“thorough” discrimination that not only identifies the free riders, but also further
distinguishes the high-cost non free riders from the low-cost non free riders can also be
studied. Also, the current research placed a constraint of positive incentives on the
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model. In practice, although a company cannot explicitly impose a negative incentive
(or a penalty) on a prospect or customer, it can use other means, e.g., membership fees,
initiation fees, and renewal fees, to achieve the objective of negative incentive.

One

needs to be careful in taking such an approach because there might not be a continuum
from incentives to neutrality to disincentives that customers react to in a linear fashion.
This is at least partly due to the fact that companies tend to brag about positive incentives
and bury the negative ones in the fine print. Nevertheless, a model allowing negative
incentive and also negative acquisition and retention that discourages unprofitable
prospects or customers can be a possible direction of future studies.

Finally, from an even broader perspective, one can connect the current research to other
related issues. For example, many marketing companies utilized geo-demographic data
clusters that categorize consumers into different clusters or segments instead of
continuous scores. Therefore, we can view this as an additional constraint to the model
that the criteria for classifying customers are discrete, instead of continuous.
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Tables
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Table 1. Examples of Switching Cost and Incentive
Incentives
(Examples)

Low
Low

Artificial
switching
cost
created by
contract?
Yes
Yes

Low

No.

High

Point/
Mileage
No.

Low Introductory
Rate/
Point or cash rebate

Level of
natural
switching cost
Cell Phone
Cable
TV/Satellite
Credit Card

Bank
Accounts/
Trading
Accounts

On-line
Services
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One-time Cash discount
One-time Cash discount

One-time Cash Bonus
($50-$100)

Table 2. Price Discount vs. Incentive

Strategic
Specific
Objectives
Operational

Effects
(Time
Perspective)

Specific
Questions
Product-centered or
customer-centered?
Is switching cost
involved?
Is it aimed at
acquisition/retention?
Scope of Target?
Publicized

Price Discount

Acquisition/Retention
Incentives
Product-centered Customer-centered

Affect current period
or multi-period
demand?

Increases current Increases current
period and multiperiod demand
period demand
only

No

Yes

Mass targeted
Publicized

Individual/group
targeted
nd sometimes
confidential.
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Table 3. Customer Types and Switching Costs
Type of Customers

Existing Customers
At-large Customers
Competitors’ Customers

Natural
Switching-in
Cost
N/A
Low
High
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Natural
Switching-out
Cost
Low or High
N/A
N/A

Table 4. Terms in the Model
Terms

Definition

Acquired

A new customer who
signed up and will stay for
a minimum of one year
An existing customer who
will stay for a minimum
of one additional year
Customers acquired as a
percentage of total
prospect customers in a
month
Customers retained as a
percentage of total
existing customers in a
month.
Amount of money offered
to a prospect customer for
the purpose of acquisition
in a month
Total Amount of money
spent on acquisition
incentives in a month
Amount of money offered
to an existing customer
for the purpose of
retention in a month
Total Amount of money
spent on retention
incentives in a month

Retained
Acquisition
Rate
Retention
Rate
Acquisition
Incentive
Acquisition
Expenditure
Retention
Incentive
Retention
Expenditure
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Unit

Operational Calculation

%

Number of Acquired/
Number of Total Prospect

%

Number of Retained/
Number of Total Existing

$ per
person
$
$ per
person
$

Table 5. Free Riders and Non Free Riders
Free rider

Non free rider

Incentive needed
to acquire or retain

Prospects

Switch Cost<=0

Switch Cost>0

Incentive>Switch cost

Existing Customer

Switch Cost>0

Switch Cost<0

Incentive>- Switch Cost
(or Incentive>Switch Benefit)
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Table 6. Variables in the Base Model

variables
x1
x2
f1
f2
g1
g2
r1
r2

C

Definition
the acquisition incentive dollar amount
offered to prospect customers
the retention incentive dollar amount
offered to existing customers
the total number of free-riders among
prospect customers
the total number of free-riders among
existing customers
the total number of non free-riders
among prospect customers
the total number of non free-riders
among existing customers
the maximum switching-in cost of
prospect customers
the maximum switching-out benefit of
existing customers
the predetermined target of total number
of customers (sum of acquired and
retained)
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Unit
$/Person
$/Person
Person
Person
Person
Person
$/Person
$/Person
Person

Table 7. Variables in the Extended Model

variables
x1
x2
f1
f2
g1
g2
r1
r2

C
z1
z2
m1
m2

Definition
the acquisition incentive dollar amount
offered to prospect customers
the retention incentive dollar amount
offered to existing customers
the total number of free-riders among
prospect customers
the total number of free-riders among
existing customers
the total number of non free-riders
among prospect customers
the total number of non free-riders
among existing customers
the maximum reservation price of
prospect customers
the maximum reservation price of
existing customers
the total number of customers (sum of
acquired and retained)
Analytics spending on acquisition
Analytics spending on retention
Analytics $ required to identify all
acquisition free-riders
Analytics $ required to identify all
retention free-riders
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Unit
$/person
$/person
Person
Person
Person
Person
$/person
$/person
person
$
$
$
$

Table 8. Summary of Extended Model Results
Cost of analytics
required to identify
all free riders
m1
Optimal Acquisition
Analytics Spending
(z1)
Acquisition Incentive
(x1)
Retention Incentive
(x2)

Less Costly

Moderately Costly

Very Costly

0 < m1 < M L
z1=z0

M L < m1 < M H
0< z1<z0

M H < m1
z1=0

x1>0

x1>0

Base model

x2=0

x2>0

Base model
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Figures
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Figure 1. Determinants in Customer Switching Decision

Switching or not?
Condition: Incentive > Switching Cost (Benefit)?
Switching cost

Incentives

(Switch-In vs. Switch-Out)

(Acquisition vs. Retention)

Natural
Cost

Preferences

Artificial
Cost

Others
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Figure 2. Acquisition Free Riders

Switching
Cost
r1

Incentive
(x)

Acquired

0

Free riders
(f)

Non Free riders
(g)

Number Acquired=All Free Riders + x/r1 * Non Free Riders
Where r is the maximum switching cost
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Number of
Prospects
(f+g)

Figure 3. Retention Free Riders

Switching
cost
Free riders
(f)

Non Free riders
(g)
Number of
Customers

0

Incentive (x)

-x

Retained

-r2
Number Retained=All Free Riders + x/r2 * Non Free Riders
Where r2 is the maximum switching benefit (or Negative Switching Cost)
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Remaining Free-riders

Figure 4. Unidentified Free Riders as a Function of Analytics Spending
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Figure 5. Analytics Spending and Total Expenditure: Low m

800000
700000

Total
Expenditure

600000
500000
400000
300000
200000
100000
0
$-

$5,000.00

$10,000.00

$15,000.00

Analytics Spending

104

$20,000.00

$25,000.00

Figure 6. Analytics Spending and Total Expenditure: High m
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Figure 7. Effects of Very Effective Retention Incentive
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Total Expenditure

Figure 8. Effects of Moderately Effective Retention Incentive
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Figure 9. Effects of Weakly Effective Retention Incentive
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Appendix I: Consistency with Life-Time Value (LTV)
formulation

In this section, I will demonstrate that the current model is consistent with LTV model
formulation, and the conclusions drawn from this model is equally valid under several
simple assumptions.

LTV (Life-time value) definition and calculation

Life-time value of a customer is the present value of future stream of incomes this
customer brings. It is recognized as a common tool for evaluating customer values.
Gupta (2003) presents LTV calculations in a three-step fashion. First, the LTV of a
customer is calculated; then customers are aggregated to “cohorts”; finally cohorts are
aggregated to the portfolio. LTV can be regarded as the value of the customer portfolio.

Many conditions can be assumed to simplify the calculation and aggregation, for
example, one can assume the constant profit margin of a customer from period to period,
etc.

LTV can incorporate various costs. For example, Gupta (2003) lists the basic LTV that
calculates on profit margin (or income) only and an LTV that account for both profit
margin and acquisition costs. For this study, I will name a few varieties:
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LTV (M): profit margin only. This will be used in the proof that multi-period LTV can
be simplified to single period.
LTV(M,A,R): profit margin, acquisition, and retention costs. This will be used in the
base model.
LTV (M,A,R,D): profit margin, acquisition, retention, and discrimination costs. This
will be used in the extended models.

Scenario: Portfolio with a preset number of customers

Because of the economics of production, a firm often has a volume of output that is
optimal with respect to production costs and revenue. The goal of the marketing
department is then to maintain this optimal level of demand, or in our case, an optimal
number of customers.

Therefore,
1) The optimal number of customers based on production constraints and optimal
output level is N.
2) Without efforts of acquiring new customers and retaining existing customers,
natural attrition will decrease the number of customers to a level below the
optimal N.
3) Consequently, the goal of acquisition and retention is to maintain the number of
customers at the level of n for the current period. Mathematically, this can be
expressed as: Number acquired + Number retained = N.
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Assumptions
These assumptions will be important in simplifying the calculation and making the
mathematical derivation valid.

4) Constant margin of a customer in the calculation of LTV of a customer: The
constant margin means that the profit margin remains the same from period to
period for the same customer.
5) Constant retention rate in the calculation of LTV of a customer: Although for a
particular customer, his retention rate for any period is either 0 or 1, to calculate
his LTV, which is actually an “expected” value of LTV, we use the portfolio’s
retention rate. So the constant retention rate is also with respect to time period,
meaning that the retention rate of the portfolio remains the same from one period
to the next.
6) Equal margin of customers in the base model: This is an assumption for the base
model only. Here, the “equal margin” means all customers have the same
amount of profit margin regardless whether he is a new customer or an existing
customer. The reason for this assumption is that it allows the customer
portfolio’s value to be represented by the number of customers in that portfolio
minus the cost of acquisition and retention. This will simplify the calculation
involved and still maintain the model result’s reasonable robustness and its ability
to generalize.
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Proof of Equivalency between Single-period and Multi-period

Life-time value of a customer is the present value of future stream of incomes this
customer brings. If we denote the profit margin that a customer generates during a
specific period t as mt, then the life-time value of the customer (LV), with a discount rate
of i, and a constant retention rate of r, is given by the following formula (Gupta, 2003):
∞

mt r t
LV = ∑
t
t = 0 (1 + i )

(1)

Under the assumption of an equal revenue stream (constant margin) and a constant
retention rate, the life-time value can be reduced to a single-period value scaled by a
constant.

Proof:
Assuming constant margin for all time period, then mt = m, therefore,
∞

∞
mt r t
rt
=m (∑
) =m ∗ g
LV = ∑
t
t
t = 0 (1 + i )
t = 0 (1 + i )

(2)

Where m is the constant margin and g is a constant (g is a function of i, the discount rate,
and r, the retention rate. Since both i and r are assumed constant, g is a constant.)

If we define First-Period-Value (FPV) as the life-time value given t=0, then
0

FPV = LV |t =0 = ∑
t =0

mt r t
= m0 = m
(1 + i ) t

(3)

(Or simply, FPV is the current period’s margin.)
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From (2) and (3), we have

LV = FPV * g

(4)
∞

Where g is a constant, g = ∑
t =0

rt
(1 + i)t

Interpretation: The life-time value (based on multi-period calculation) can be expressed
as a constant times the First-period Value.

In summary, with the assumption of constant margin and constant retention rate,
maximizing the single period (current period or first period) value is equivalent to
maximizing LV(Life-time Value). Therefore, the conclusion drawn from single-period
evaluation will be equally valid under multi-period or Life-time situations.

Unit of analysis: Cohorts, Portfolio

The unit of analysis in Gupta’s (2003) LTV model is a “cohort” of customers. Because
of attrition, a percentage of the cohort will churn in every time period. So a retention
rate is included as one of the parameters in the calculation of the LTV. Alternatively, as
the case in similar calculations by other researchers, the attrition is represented by the
expected length of tenure, meaning that customer-ship in that cohort will effectively all
die off after an expected number of periods. In a typical portfolio, there are many
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cohorts each at various stages of “degeneration”. After each cohort’s LTV is calculated,
the entire portfolio’s LTV is then calculated by aggregating all the cohorts.

Since the analysis in this study is based on a single period time frame, there are only two
cohorts: new customers acquired and existing customers retained. And because of the
assumption of “equal margins”, the two cohorts differ only in their respective acquisition
cost and retention cost. Therefore, to maximize the portfolio’s value, we need to
maximize the summation of the value of the two cohorts. And since the total number of
the two cohorts is a constant and the margin of each customer in both cohorts is equal, the
goal of maximizing portfolio’s value can be achieved by minimizing the summation of
two cohorts’ costs, which is the summation of total acquisition cost and retention cost
(this will be the objective function).

LTV model (Gupta, 2003) vs. CPV in this study

As the mathematical proof shows, with the assumptions of the “Constant margin of a

customer” and “Constant retention rate”, a customer’s LTV (life-time value) can be
represented by a CPV (current period value) scaled by a constant. The CPV of the
portfolio in the base model of this study is CPV (M,A,R), which is the CPV calculated
based on profit margin, acquisition cost, and retention cost. And because of the
assumption of “Equal margin of customers in the base model”, and the assumption of
fixed number of total customers in the portfolio, the income of the portfolio is a constant.
The only factors that will vary are the costs of acquisition and retention.
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Therefore, when the total cost of acquisition and retention is minimized, as it is achieved
in the current study, the CPV (current period value) of the portfolio of the customers is
maximized. Consequently, the LTV is maximized. This is how this study is consistent
with typical LTV models.

Key differences between Gupta’s LTV and my CPV and how they reconcile

LTV
(Life time value)
CPV
(Current period
value)
Reconcile under the
condition of

Time period
Multiple period
Single period
Assumptions of
Constant margin
and Constant
retention rate

Unit
Multiple Cohorts at
various stages of
“degeneration”
Two cohorts: acquired
and retained

Optimization
Maximize
Income minus costs

Single period

Assumption of
Equal margin and
Fixed number of
customers

Minimize costs

Summary
The objective function of the study will be to maximize life-time value (LTV) of the
portfolio.

For the base model, with the assumptions listed above
Maximize LTV of the portfolio
= Maximize the sum of cohort of the acquired and the cohort of the retained (Standard
LTV definition)
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=Maximized the CPV of the two cohorts (see proof of multi-period to single period
equivalency, with the assumption of constant margin and constant retention)
=Minimize sum of (acquisition cost + retention cost) (with the assumptions of equal
margin and fixed number of customers)

Therefore, the objective function is reduced to minimizing the total acquisition and
retention costs. Because of the mathematical equivalency proved above, the conclusion
drawn from this analysis will be valid under LTV criterion.
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